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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Agricultural biosecurity is a concern on many levels: local, regional, state, national and 
international. The U.S. agricultural sector, which includes both plants and animals, in managed 
and un-managed ecosystems including crops, forestry, range lands and aquatic systems, is 
vulnerable in the U.S. This vulnerability is due in part to the lack of security and surveillance 
systems and the enormous amount of land this industry uses (Harl 2002). Varying definitions of 
biosecurity have been published but blending those of the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy and the New Zealand Ministry 
for Primary Industries, presents biosecurity as an integrated series of strategies that combines 
policy and regulations to assess risk factors of food safety, animal and plant health, and 
environmental impact in an effort to prevent transmission of harmful biological agents to persons 
or the environment (FAO 2003; Guy 2013; OSTP 2013).  
To achieve a goal of maintaining and sustaining plant and animal health, biosecurity 
agencies must engage subject matter experts in order to make decisions based on prioritization of 
microbial agents that threaten human, plant, animal and environmental health. In addition, 
agricultural biosecurity agencies must be in communication with growers and the public to 
maintain trust and use the agency’s resources to collect data to enable appropriate responses and 
response times in the event a disease outbreak occurs.
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Within the United States, the responsibility of protecting agricultural interest is divided 
among the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Defense, Federal Burial of Investigation and others, in a collaborative effort to 
provide logistical support needed in protecting American agricultural interests.  To assist in 
developing of portions of biosecurity protocols, the federal government collaborates with land-
grant universities, agribusinesses, Cooperative Extension personnel, and other relevant 
organizations (Parker 2003).   
Plant pathogens pose a unique biosecurity threat for many reasons. A majority of plant 
pathogenic microorganisms do not sicken humans directly, but can be harmful indirectly by 
damaging food crops and ornamentals. Unlike humans, plants cannot be vaccinated against 
diseases. If one plant, in a group of susceptible plants, becomes infected with a pathogen, the 
surrounding plants cannot simply move. In the current era of dense monoculturing and low 
genetic diversity, a pathogen can easily spread throughout a susceptible crop. For a would-be 
perpetrator, information is readily available online discussing the propagation and dissemination 
of plant pathogenic microorganisms (Champoiseau and Momol 2008; Sullivan et al. 2011). 
Besides intentional introduction of plant pathogens, non-intentional dispersion of plant pathogens 
occurs.  
Factors contributing to unintentional pathogen introduction include wind, rain, flooding 
and hurricanes (Aylor 2003). In addition to weather, insects play a role in dispersal of 
phytopathogens within a field (Brault et al. 2010; Backus et al. 2012). Most agricultural goods 
including plant and animal products are transported from state to state and country to country, 
increasing the likelihood of exotic pathogen introduction to the U.S. As mentioned previously, the 
high levels of genetic uniformity and high plant densities characteristic of modern cropping 
systems pose added risks of a pathogen(s) severely damaging or destroying an entire crop. These 
risks are compounded by the varying degrees of pathogen virulence, making it critical, with 
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certain pathogens, to quickly identify pathovar, biovar, or race. Thus, diagnosticians rely upon 
plant pathogen detection and identification tools that are specific, as well as being rapid and 
inexpensive (Brault et al. 2010; Meyer 2003). 
Many immuno- and nucleic acid based assays are available for detection of plant 
pathogens (Schaad et al. 2003). For rapid, inexpensive pathogen detection, immunoassays such as 
enzyme-linked immunosorbance (ELISA) and immune-strip tests can be used but these often lack 
sensitivity required for a biosecurity application. In contrast, nucleic acid based tests such as the  
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and multilocus PCR offer the high degree of sensitivity required 
for biosecurity applications, but are limited in the total number of pathogens they will detect 
(Postnikova et al. 2008). Ideally, a biosecurity assay could quickly detect any and all classes 
(prokaryote, eukaryotes, and viruses) of pathogens, including unknowns, in a given sample, at a 
degree of sensitivity comparable to that of nucleic acid based detections. Such approaches have 
been applied to the detection of known and unknown plant viruses in mammals, insects and plants 
(Adams et al. 2009, Roossinck et al. 2009, Cox-Foster et al. 2007; Palacios et al. 2008), leading 
Stobbe et al. (2013) to hypothesize that metagenomics combined with NGS has the potential to be 
used as a plant pathogen detection tool.  
Current NGS technologies produce enormous amounts of data, which, depending on the 
methods used to gather DNA, can contain the genomic profile of all organisms in a given sample 
in their natural environment (Chen and Pachter 2005). Together; the advances in metagenomics 
and NGS will assist biosecurity agencies in lessening the risks of disease outbreak from exotic 
and native plant pathogens by providing a powerful screening tool. Combining these two 
technologies will facilitate development of a plant pathogen detection system that will meet 
current needs and future needs.  To achieve this, a partnership between academia and the 
government has been made. 
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The National Institute for Microbial Forensics & Food and Agricultural Biosecurity 
(NIMFFAB) at Oklahoma State University partners with U.S. and international agricultural 
biosecurity entities to address current and future biological threats to crops and food safety.  In 
one initiative, researchers at NIMFFAB and the Foreign Disease and Weeds Research Laboratory 
of the United States Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS), are 
collaborating to develop novel technologies to monitor, detect and identify plant or foodborne 
pathogens in complex samples. As a whole, the project addresses bacterial, viral, and fungal 
pathogens, but the research presented in this thesis focuses on the prokaryotic plant pathogens.  
The objectives are as follows:  
1.  To create bioinformatic pipelines, streamlined computer programs, for mock sample 
database generation used in simulating 454 sequencer runs, query using specifically 
designed “electronic probes,” and BLAST searches.  
a. Vitis vinfera (wine grape) was used as a host for mock database development 
b. Xanthomonas oryzae pv. Oryzae PXO99A, Ralstonia solanacearum GMI1000 as 
a substitute for R. solanacearum r3b2, Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus psy62, 
and Xylella fastidiosa 9a5c (8.1b) were used as targeted bacteria 
 
2. To demonstrate the ability to use metagenomics methodology combined with NGS and 
electronic probes to identify targeted bacterial plant pathogens from raw sequence data. 
a. Inoculations of potato plants with R. solanacearum r3b2 will be done by USDA-
ARS at their onsite BSL-3 facility 
b. Inoculations of tomato plants with P. syringae pv. tomato str. DC3000 (DC3000) 
were done by NIMFFAB. The addition of DC3000 was due to ready availability 
to the bacterium and host.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
History: Vulnerability of the United States to terrorism and biocrimes  
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and 
subsequent anthrax mail attacks and, more recently, the Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 
2013, demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States to acts of terrorism (Flynn 2002; 
Comfort and Kapucu 2006; Speckhard 2013). The September 11
th
 events and the Boston 
Marathon bombing were the result of a few radical individuals; these, together with the anthrax 
incident, show that mass economic and civilian casualties can result from the actions of only one 
or a few individuals. In fact, the latter crime was attributed to an American scientist who had 
passed stringent governmental clearances. Such events indicate that individuals or non-state 
groups can bypass tactical methods of traditional warfare and use unpredictable and increasingly 
psychologically devastating approaches that undermine governments, creating a sense of 
insecurity for citizens of the targeted nation or region (Bradley et al. 2004; Blendon et al. 2002; 
Miller et al. 2013).  
Security implementations  
As a result of the September 11th World Trade Center/Pentagon and anthrax incidents, 
the U.S. government implemented new security programs to identify weaknesses in America’s 
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critical infrastructures and to make changes necessary to reduce significantly the chance that a 
future attack would be successful (Shawn 2004). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and 
other biosecurity agencies around the globe are tasked with the responsibility of identifying 
threats and weakness within their national infrastructures and insuring the continuing growth and 
longevity of their respective economies, while protecting their citizens. However, even with the 
U.S. government’s implementation of new and more stringent security procedures, the U.S. 
agriculture sector continues to be vulnerable to both direct and indirect threats.  
The agricultural industry, which includes animals, food crops, forestry, range lands and 
water resources, provides opportunity for addressing biosecurity concerns due to the lack of 
security and surveillance systems and to the enormous amount of land that this industry uses 
(Harl 2002). Enhanced monitoring and screening or surveillance of plant and animal samples is 
critical in maintaining a robust biosecurity program (Bunn et al. 2011; Fisher et al. 2012; Guy 
2013).  
Bioterrorism 
Bioterrorism is the threat or intentional release of biological agents with the goal of 
generating fear, intimidation, or harm to a population or specific group for religious, political, 
and/or economic purposes (Budowle 2005).  The ultimate objective is to undermine a government 
or to achieve personal objectives by releasing microorganisms, toxins, or other deadly bio-
organisms (ADHS 2012; Budowle 2005). In the United States, biological agents used in 
bioterrorism acts against humans are separated into three main categories, according to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC 2010): A, high priority, B, moderate priority, 
and C, low priority. Category A agents are infrequently observed in the United States and are 
considered a “national security risk”. They are transmitted from one person to another, have an 
elevated death rate and create social unrest. Category B agents can be disseminated fairly easy 
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and have a slightly less ability to cause illness and death than category A. Lastly, Category C 
agents are the third highest priority due to their ease of dissemination and propagation. 
Additionally, category C agents can cause illness and death but not comparable to those in 
categories A and B (CDC 2010). While bioterrorism is typically defined as a direct attack on a 
government and/or its citizens, this definition fails to consider other forms of bioterrorism that 
have equal potential to cause civil unrest or the continual evolution of national security needs. 
Agroterrorism 
Agroterrorism is the intentional introduction of a plant or animal pathogen for the 
purpose of undermining government stability, generating fear, or causing economic losses and 
social instability (Monke 2007). Within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) is given the responsibility for 
implementing the Agriculture Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, which provides guidelines for 
determining agriculture select agents and toxins (APHIS 2008). Agriculture and veterinary select 
agents and toxins are those that are determined to have a potential to pose a severe threat to plant 
health or plant products, or animal health or animal products (APHIS 2008). Considerations for 
classifying an agent or toxin as an agriculture select agent includes; effects from exposure of 
agents or toxins to marketability and production of plant or animal products; the pathogenicity of 
the agent or toxin and the methods it is transferred to animals or plants; the ability to treat and 
prevent illnesses caused by the agent or toxin; and any additional criteria the USDA Secretary 
deems important for protection of animal or plant health, or animal or plant products (APHIS 
2008).  The agricultural select agents list includes Bacillus anthracis, Ralstonia solanacearum, 
Enterovirus 71, Hendra virus and many others (Federal Register 2012). Egypt, Iran, North Korea, 
Syria, and the United States, along with many other countries are thought to have or had a history 
of biological weapons programs dedicated to the development of agents for the offensive purpose 
10 
 
of agroterrorism and according to the Biological Weapons Convention, under the regulation of 
the United Nations, biological warfare programs are prohibited (MIIS 2009; UN 2012).  
An agricultural attack generally has several key objectives: decreasing food output for 
both human and animal consumption, significant national and/or global economic losses relating 
to the agriculture industry and forestry lands, possible export/import trade embargoes, and 
undermining governments by instilling a lack of confidence in the safety of the food supply 
(CIDRAP 2010). As seen in the 2008 Middle East food riots, the current world economic 
instability, along with high food prices, has the potential to escalate tension among nations and 
destabilize weakened governments (McMichael 2009). This issue is compounded by the presence 
of endemic plant pathogens in crops, which farmers must address in order to maintain a profitable 
economic threshold. A purposeful introduction of new plant pathogens poses a significant risk 
due to there being a lack of natural suppression factors and possible resulting in an uncontrolled 
disease outbreak (Schwartz et al. 2006).     
The use of a plant pathogen as a weapon is usually health-risk free for the perpetrators 
because, unlike human and zoonotic pathogens, most plant pathogens are harmless to humans. 
Furthermore, there are numerous plant pathogens, which cause various diseases, giving a 
perpetrator the opportunity to sequester, propagate and disperse or engineer agriculturally 
devastating bacterial, fungal or viral strains while leaving little to no evidence (RAND 1999). 
Having very little evidence makes attribution of a perpetrator extremely difficult.  
History of bioterrorism 
The historical use of bioterrorism tactics dates back to ancient times; however, more 
recent events have occurred in the U.S. (Abbott 1990; Breeze 2004; Johnson 2013). In a 2003 
report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh was the first 
person to commit a biocrime on U.S. soil and an example of the danger of an enemy within. The 
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cult leader settled with many followers in Wasco County, Oregon in the 1980’s (Abbott 1990). 
After disputes arose among local officials, in an effort to sway political outcomes, cult members 
introduced Salmonella to several local restaurant salad bars in hopes of affecting an upcoming 
election. This crime resulted in 750 persons becoming ill (Dyckman 2003). More recently, in 
2003, an employee of a Michigan supermarket purposefully introduced Black Leaf 40, an 
insecticide for sucking insects on plants, and for lice and mites on chickens, leading to illness in 
approximately 100 individuals (CDC 2003). Fortunately, in both cases the contamination was 
contained to a small region. Together, the examples illustrate the vulnerability of America’s 
agriculture industry even in areas protected by security measures more stringent than those in 
place for field crops, and how the actions of a few individuals can cause physical and 
psychological anguish to hundreds and possibly thousands of people.  
In the event that individuals or groups, foreign and/or domestic, purposely introduced 
either enteric-human or plant pathogens into U.S. food plants , the consequences have the 
potential to cause harm, as noted by the Gilmore Commission in a 1999 report to the President 
and Congress which stated, “…concerted biological attack against an agriculture target offers 
terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success and which 
also has the prospect of obtaining political objectives, such as undermining confidence in the 
ability of a government or giving terrorists an improved bargaining position” (RAND 1999). 
Whether considering unintentional food contamination, natural disease outbreaks, or bioterrorist 
acts it is critical to have methodologies in place that are thoroughly validated in pathogen 
detection and identification. By having certified protocols for detection of relevant pathogens, 
response and recovery time is greatly reduced.    
To lessen the risk posed by bacterial select agents and non-select agents the Foreign 
Disease and Weeds Research Laboratory of the United States Department of Agriculture-
Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS) and the National Institute for Microbial Forensics & 
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Food and Agricultural Biosecurity (NIMFFAB) at Oklahoma State University, are collaborating 
to develop novel technologies to monitor, detect and identify bacterial plant pathogens in 
complex samples. Bacterial pathogens of interest include Xylella fastidiosa 9a5c, Xanthomonas 
oryzae pv. oryzae,  Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 biovar 2 and Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus 
(Table 2).  
The bacterial pathogens were chosen based on the availability of the genome or 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs), which are short (500 -800 nt) sub-sequences of cDNA; the 
economic importance of the pathogens, select agent status; and the availability to be propagates at 
the USDA-ARS (Fort Detrick, Maryland) containment facility. 
Bacterial Plant Pathogens 
Xylella fastidiosa 9a5c 
The disease citrus variegated chlorosis (CVC) affects a variety of citrus species (Pooler 
1995; Brlansky et al. 2008; Redak et al. 2004). The causal organism, Xylella fastidiosa, was 
classified by the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) as a select agent; however, in 2012 it was removed from the list. The decision to 
remove X. fastidiosa was based on the potential of the bacterium to cause mass causalities or 
devastating effects on the economy, critical infrastructure, or public health (Federal Register 
2012).Additionally, evaluations of the bacterium assessing morbidity and mortality, low 
infectious dose, availability of countermeasures, and risk of deliberate misuse including historical 
documentation of weaponization were performed by experts who study the bacterium (Federal 
Register 2012). The principle strategies in place for controlling this pathogen are introduction 
prevention and development of cost effective early detection and identification systems (Ancona 
et al. 2010; Brlansky et al. 2008). X. fastidiosa 9a5c is a fastidious, Gram-negative, xylem-limited 
bacterium phenotypically identical to other strains of X. fastidiosa (Hartung et al. 1994). The host 
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range includes plum, almond, coffee, oak, citrus, peach, oleander, and grapevine. Transmission in 
the U.S. occurs by various xylem feeding insects including, most notably, the glassy-winged 
sharpshooters (Homalodisca vitripennis) and blue-green sharpshooters (Graphocephala 
atropunctata) (Chatterjee et al. 2008).  
There are three primary steps involved in vector-to-plant transmission of X. fastidiosa 
(Janes and Obradovic 2010). After the xylem feeding sharpshooter ingests the bacterium from an 
infected plant, X. fastidiosa attaches to the lining of the vector’s foregut. Finally, the vector feeds 
on a new host plant, inoculating it with X. fastidiosa and completing the transmission cycle.  
With many vector borne bacterial plant pathogens, the first and final steps of ingestion 
and transmission to the host are active processes separated by a latent period during which the 
bacteria multiply; however, X. fastidiosa does not need a latent period and is termed a foregut-
borne pathogen (Nault 1997; Purcell and Finlay 1979). Transmission also occurs months after 
initial bacterial acquisition (Hill and Purcell 1994). The latent period is due to X. fastidiosa 
colonizing and forming biofilms, made up of extracellular polymeric substances (EPS), within the 
vector foregut, hours after initial acquisition (Lorite et al. 2013; Marques et al. 2002). Attachment 
within the sharpshooter or plant is mediated by two forms of pili; the short Type I and the longer 
Type IV. Type I pili are necessary in bacterial attachment and biofilm formation, which enhance 
bacterial survival. Type IV pili, which are clustered at just one pole of the cell, facilitate upstream 
translocation within the plant xylem vessels via twitching motility (Chatterjee et al. 2008; Meng 
et al. 2005).To release bacteria contained in a biofilm inside the vector foregut, salivary enzymes 
EGase and other cell-wall degrading enzymes loosen the matrix allowing bacteria to pass into the 
plant as the insect feeds (Backus et al. 2012). Only a few bacteria are needed for transmission to 
occur (Hill and Purcell 1995). This represents the highly infectious nature of X. fastidiosa when it 
is established in a vector and its ability to damage and/or destroy large amounts of crop as the 
vector moves from one leaf/plant to another.  
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Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzae 
Bacterial leaf blight (BLB) or bacterial blight (BB) and bacterial leaf streak (BLS) are 
major diseases of rice (Oryzae sativa) around the globe. The causal organisms are, Xanthomonas 
oryzae pv. oryzae and Xanthomonas oryzae pv. Oryzicola. The casual organism, X.oryzae pv. 
oryzae, is classified by APHIS as a select agent. As with all plant pathogenic microbial select 
agents, the principle management strategy is prevention of introduction into the U.S. through all 
borders and ports. X. oryzae is a yellow, slime-producing, Gram-negative rod that translocates 
throughout the plant vascular tissue after infection. Two closely related pathovars, oryzae and 
oryzicola, are similar in many aspects, but pv. oryzae (Xoo) causes BB by colonizing plant 
vascular tissues while pv. oryzicola infects parenchyma cells, causing BLS (Nino-Liu et al. 
2006). The typical mode of entry is through stomata on the leaves and wounds on the stems and 
roots (Ou 1985).  Secondary inoculum consists of bacteria that ooze from the hydathodes, where 
they congregated, and are exuded onto the leaf surface (Mew et al. 1993). X. oryzae is transmitted 
primarily by rain, wind, and flooding. Natural movement of the pathogen is limited to short 
distances; however human influence such as the movement of infected seeds has led to distant 
outbreaks of disease (Hsieh et al. 1974).  Current distribution of the pathovars is illustrated in 
Table 1.  
While X. oryzae is found around the globe where rice is grown, in some countries its 
distribution is limited to a particular region. For example, in Australia Xoo is found only in 
Northern Territories and Queensland, while in Asia X. oryzae pv. oryzicola is limited to tropical 
areas. Because it causes major diseases of rice, a staple food around the world, for which there is 
worldwide demand, especially among Asian countries.  X. oryzae poses significant risk to crop 
security across the globe.  
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Ralstonia solanacearum 
Previously known as Pseudomonas solanacearum, Ralstonia solanacearum is a motile, 
soil borne, Gram negative, rod-shaped bacterium with polar flagella (Denny 2006). The bacteria 
enter the plant through wounds below ground caused by nematodes and cracks in lateral root 
emergence, and quickly move to the aerial parts of the plant through the vascular system 
(Mansfield et al. 2012).  R. solanacearum is disseminated primarily in the soil through 
contaminated water sources, infected planting material, contaminated equipment and personnel 
(Janse 1996). 
R. solanacearum, as a species, has a very broad plant host range and causes wilting 
diseases in over 450 plant species in tropical, subtropical and warm temperate regions (Genin and 
Boucher 2004; Hayward 1991). The bacteria are divided into subcategories based on their host 
range (five races) and their biochemical utilization patterns (up to five biovars) (Table 3). 
Because of its broad host range, R. solanacearum has a high potential of invading uninfected 
regions through trade and interstate or local commerce (Champoiseau et al. 2010; CABI), and has 
been labeled the most destructive plant pathogen with damages reaching over $1 billion in global 
losses each year (Mansfield et al. 2012; Elphinstone 2005). The fact that most R. solanacearum 
strains do not travel long distances keeps infection areas mostly localized.  Long distance 
movement requires unnatural intervention (man-made transportation). 
Of the five R. solanacearum races, race 3 biovar 2 (r3b2), which is classified by the 
USDA-APHIS as a select agent, is unique in its ability to tolerate cooler temperatures and higher 
altitudes and was first officially identified in the Netherlands in 1992 (Jansen 1996; Messiha et al. 
2009). Even before it was classified a select agent; this bacterium was considered a risk for use as 
a bioterrorism agent (Lambert 2002). R. solanacearum r3b2, which causes brown rot of potato 
and tomato, was documented as entering the United States in 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2004 through 
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importation of infected geranium cuttings from Africa, Central America, Kenya and Guatemala 
(Champoiseau et al. 2010). Successful R. solanacearum r3b2 eradication procedures were 
performed in each case, and as of 2013 no widespread outbreaks of the pathogen within the U.S. 
borders has been reported.  
The virulence of R. solanacearum is based upon three primary factors: extracellular 
polysaccharides, a Type III secretion system and Type IV pili. Other important factors include 
cell wall degrading enzymes, oxidative stress genes, and quorum sensing (Schell 2000; Flores-
Cruz and Allen 2011). The most important of these is exopolysaccharides, which clog and 
colonize the plant vascular system and are used by the bacteria as a barrier against host defenses 
(Saile et al. 1997; Milling et al. 2011). Exopolysaccharide mutants were found to be non-
pathogenic in vivo and in planta, while a non-mutants colonized plant tissues, leading to wilting 
(Araud-Razou et al. 1998).  The Type III secretion system (T3SS), which moves bacterial effector 
proteins into the host cell, is required for both disease and the hypersensitive response in 
susceptible plants, (Cornels and Gijsegem 2000). When the hrp genes encoding the T3SS are 
silenced, the bacteria become non-pathogenic (Buttner and Bonas 2002). The R. solanacearum 
type IV pili generate twitching motility during initial invasion and colonization (Tans-Kersten et 
al. 2001and Liu et al. 2001). Non-motile mutants (lacking type IV pili) failed to cause measurable 
disease; however, when the same non-motile mutants were injected directly into tomato plant 
tissues disease presented similarly to the wild type (Tans-Kersten et al. 2001).  
Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus 
The disease commonly referred to as citrus greening or citrus huanglongbing (HLB) is 
attributed to three species of fastidious, phloem-limited Gram-negative alpha-proteobacteria 
having a worldwide distribution. Candidatus Liberibacter americanus, Candidatus Liberibacter 
africanus, and Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus together are responsible for damaging citrus 
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crops around the globe, leading to the destruction of millions of citrus trees (Bove 2006).  Of the 
three species, only Ca. L. asiaticus was identified in the U.S., where it was found by both PCR 
and next generation sequencing in both symptomatic and non-symptomatic citrus leaf tissues 
(Sagaram et al. 2009; Tyler et al. 2009). Disease symptoms, which are often non-uniform on the 
tree, include blotchy mottling of leaves with varying shades of yellow and green, and small and 
disfigured fruit. The tree canopy can range from full foliage to none, depending on disease 
severity.  Damage to growers from HLB is caused by poor fruit yields, short tree life-span and 
unmarketable, small, disfigured fruits. The citrus crop in Florida alone is valued at $9 billion 
dollars annually. The primary means by which Ca. L. asiaticus is spread from one citrus plant to 
another in the U.S. is by the vector Diaphorina citri, the Asian citrus psyllid (ACP). The other 
known vector of HLB, not found in the U.S., is Trioza erytreae, the African psyllid.  
Because 60-100% of ACP acquire the HLB bacteria during nymphal stages and up to 
40% as adults, all life stages are a concern to growers and pose a threat to the citrus industry 
(Pelz-Stelinski et al. 2010).  Once ACP acquires Ca. L. asiaticus it is maintained for up to12 
weeks, which is very close to the insects’ 90 day lifespan (Hung et al. 2004).  There are 
conflicting reports about whether Ca. L. asiaticus propagates within the ACP. Inoue et al. (2009) 
exposed ACP fifth instar nymphs to Ca. L. asiaticus for 24 hours; qPCR at days 10, 15, and 20 
revealed a 25, 360 and 130 fold increase, respectively, in Ca. L. asiaticus titers compared to day 
1. But, Pelz-Stenlinski et al. (2010) found that Ca. L. asiaticus titers in adult ACPs decreased over 
time as the insects fed on healthy plants.  There is agreement, however, that nymphal ACPs are 
the principle means of spreading the pathogen, suggesting that early application of integrated pest 
management (IPM) strategies can be instrumental in maintaining profitability for U.S. citrus 
growers.   
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Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato str. DC3000 (DC3000) 
Pseudomonas syringae are rod shaped and Gram-negative plant pathogenic bacteria with 
polar flagella. The current 50 pathovars are divided into races based on their degree of host 
specificity (Gardan et al. 1999). Diseases caused by Pseudomonas syringae include bacterial 
speck of tomato, brown spot of bean, blight of soybean and canker of kiwi. Of the various 
pathovars and strains, P. syringae pv. tomato str. DC3000 (DC3000) is the most commonly used 
to study virulence mechanisms in both model systems (Arabidopsis thaliana) and commercially 
relevant crops such as tomato.  
Dissemination of DC3000 occurs by animals, people, insects, agricultural tools, soil 
particles and contaminated water (Bashan 1986). DC3000 will persist from one season to the next 
in crop debris and within weeds such as nightshade and groundcherry (Davis et al. 2008). 
Historically, DC3000 has played a unique and vital role in understanding basic virulence 
mechanisms of plant pathogenic prokaryotes.   
During the 1980’s little was known about the pathogenicity genes of phytopathogenic 
bacteria. In Cuppels (1986) reported that Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato strain DC3000 could 
be transformed with  a rifampicin-resistance gene (Cupples 1986). Because of Cupples work, 
DC3000, a genetically modified bacterium, is now one of several model bacteria used universally 
for molecular interaction studies and also makes a good surrogate for an agroterrorism agent. For 
organisms that could be used as agroterrorism agents Schaad et al. (2006) list a rating criteria. 
From the criteria, DC3000 meets the following; produces toxins, able to be manipulated, targets 
multiple host, easy to propagate and disseminate, lack of chemical control and has a high degree 
of virulence; which makes DC3000 an acceptable surrogate (Schaad et al. 2006). Additionally, 
DC3000 is not listed by APHIS as a select agent and does not require special permitting as 
needed for select agent organisms. 
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Plant Pathogen Detection Systems 
Plant pathogens are detected by a wide range of assays (Schaad et al. 2003). 
Immunoassays, such as enzyme-linked immunosorbance assay (ELISA) and immune-strip tests, 
and nucleic acid based assays, such as real time polymerase chain reaction (rtPCR) or DNA 
microarray hybridization, are popular methods for plant pathogen detection. The former offer 
quick, inexpensive, means of detection but lack the sensitivity required for biosecurity and 
forensics applications, while the latter, such as rtPCR or end-point PCR (PCR), offer a degree of 
sensitivity required for biosecurity applications but are limited in the total number of pathogens 
they can detect (Postnikova et al. 2008).  Both immunoassays and nucleic acid based methods 
require pre-characterization of a targeted pathogens proteins or genomic sequences for detection, 
which makes it very difficult to detect uncharacterized plant pathogens. Being able to detect 
multiple pathogens at the same time in a quick and cost effective manner is another limitation of 
current pathogen detection systems. DNA microarrays, SSRs, and MSLTs are all capable of 
detecting multiple pathogens, but require previous characterization and are still limited in the total 
number of pathogens they will screen. Additionally, all of these methods consume the original 
starting sample, leaving limited opportunity to reuse the material to search for additional 
pathogens. Having a single method for use on any plant material, for detection of any and all 
plant pathogens simultaneously, will greatly reduce the time it takes biosecurity agencies or local 
diagnostic labs to identify a pathogen and limit the spread of a disease. Recent 
methods/technologies of metagenomics and next generation sequencing show promise as plant 
pathogen detection tools.   
Metagenomics 
The new field of metagenomics emerged in the late 1990’s as an exciting example of how 
new technology leads to innovation (Handelsman et al. 1998).  Chen and Pachter (2005) define 
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metagenomics as the use of current genomic techniques to study communities of microorganisms 
in their natural environment, bypassing the need for isolation and cultivation of individual 
species. By this definition, metagenomic analysis differs from traditional detection approaches in 
that an entire microbial community is characterized simultaneously, offering an opportunity to 
discover unknown organisms and fastidious bacteria, obligate fungi and viruses that cannot easily 
be detected or isolated in vivo. Metagenomic sampling provides a true representation of a 
microbial environmental community at a particular moment in time, much like taking a 
photograph, except metagenomics captures a genomic snap-shot.  
Metagenomic studies begin by extraction of total nucleic acid from an environmental 
sample and sequencing it by next generation sequencing (NGS) technology, from which 
sequences are used to build a sample-sequence database (SSD) or genomic library. NGS is a term 
used to describe various platforms (Ion Torrent, 454 pyrosequencing, Illumina, and SOLiD) that 
produce millions of nucleotide sequences concurrently in an ultra-high-throughput process. In the 
metagenomic approach, characterization of this entire nucleic acid library provides insight on 
ecology, evolution, and function, enzymatic proteins and antibiotic characteristics (Anonymous 
2007). More importantly, metagenomics coupled with NGS will lead to the design of innovative 
tools for detection and identification of all classes of plant pathogenic microorganisms in a single 
assay.  
Traditionally, a single organism would be isolated and propagated from an environmental 
sample and then sequenced, resulting in a nearly complete genome that may allow identification 
of the species. Genes can be annotated with a certain degree of confidence, and, if needed, Koch’s 
postulates can be performed to establish a causal relationship between a microbe and a disease. 
However, there are disadvantages to the traditional sequencing approach. Not all organisms can 
be isolated or grown in culture. There are costs in media prep for propagation and equipment to 
obtain optimal microbial growing conditions. Because not all microbes are able to be propagated 
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in a lab setting, we do not obtain a true representation of everything going on in a particular 
sample. Additionally, there is a cost in time to prepare the isolate for sequencing, which could 
lead to a pathogen outbreak and cause economic losses for a grower.  
Metagenomics, as an alternative to traditional sequencing, offers the advantage that 
microorganisms do not need to be isolated and propagated. Because the genomes of all organisms 
are included in the sequencing, we are able to capture unknowns and fastidious organisms. The 
cost is moderated by the lack of a need to propagate the sample; nucleic acid extractions are made 
directly from the sample. Additionally, we capture biochemical pathways not yet known.  
There are disadvantages to using metagenomics. In traditional sequencing we are able to 
thoroughly characterize an organism; however, with metagenomics we only capture short 
fragments. Having small fragments makes it difficult to thoroughly characterizing a single 
microbe with a high degree of confidence. Because a metagenome is made up multiple 
organisms, there will likely be genomic information not yet known; therefore assembling an 
entire genome for a singular organism is not possible. Even with the disadvantages, the ability to 
capture genomic information for all organisms in a sample provide opportunities for detection of 
plant pathogens both known and unknown. Aside from a specific use in pathogen detection, 
metagenomics plays a critical role industrial sustainability. 
There are three primary industries using metagenomics for long-term sustainability and 
discovery of novel compounds.  The medical biotechnology industry, plant or agriculture 
biotechnology industry and all other industries not covered by medical or agricultural 
biotechnologies. Together, the industries are estimated to spend $3.74 billion by 2015 on 
enzymes (protease and carbohydrates) used in detergents, food applications, agriculture, textile, 
pharmaceuticals and many others (Anonymous. 2013; Lorenz and Eck 2005).  
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Current public and political awareness of climate changed and globalization of 
economies has led to the demand of lessening the environmental impact and improved 
sustainability for all industries across the globe. To meet this demand, metagenomics is being 
used to explore environmental communities of microorganism in hopes of discovering novel 
biocatalyst (Lorenz et al. 2002). Considering the 2015 estimate of industry spending billions on 
enzymes, the continual demand of clean and sustainable resource, and need for novel plant 
pathogenic detection tools, metagenomics methodology will continue to have a critical role in the 
future.   
Next generation sequencing 
NGS is a relatively recent technology that allows for the generation of huge amounts of 
sequence data from a given sample (Ronaghi 2001). NGS is one of three different sequencing 
technologies, commonly referred to as first, second and third generation sequencing used in 
today’s research, each with their own set of advantages and disadvantages. First generation 
sequencing technology or Sanger sequencing works by fragmenting DNA and inserting it into 
plasmids, which are then cloned to produce enough starting material for the sequencer (Sanger et 
al. 1977; Sanger and Coulson 1975). For sequencing, a dye-termination method is used, which 
allows quick sequencing of one reaction by having different light wavelengths for each ddNTP. 
Advantages of first generation sequencing include; large genome fragments with less total 
volume of data that allows for assembly of a genome at lower costs as compared to other 
sequencing technologies. Disadvantages to Sanger sequencing include; speed limitations, cloning 
bias or the inability to clone certain genes, and issues with incorporating repeat regions, both of 
which result in an incomplete genome (Sorek et al. 2007; Wooley et al. 2010).  
Second generation sequencing is commonly used today and referred to as next generation 
sequencing (NGS) and is far more productive than traditional Sanger sequencing (Pop and 
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Salzberg 2008; Magi et al. 2010; Metzker 2010). There are multiple NGS platform technologies 
that differ in read length (20 nt to approximately 1000 nt) and number (100,000 to 1 million), 
which combine to generate a range of overall sequence data (Tucker et al. 2009). The particular 
second generation sequencing technology described here is the 454 pyrosequencing by Roche 
Applied Sciences. Margulies et al. (2005) discuss the workflow of 454. Briefly, the first step is to 
randomly fragmenting genomic DNA and attaching adapters witch then bind to beads for 
emulsion PCR. Upon emulsion completion there are millions of unique DNA copies, which are 
denatured to make single stranded DNA. These fragments are placed into wells where they are 
mixed with enzymes for pyrophosphate sequencing. The final step includes a series of nucleotide 
flushes followed by washes, which work in unison as a massive and parallel sequencing reaction. 
Thousands of individual DNA fragment are being sequenced during this last phase. The 
combination of NGS technology and metagenomics offers many advantages over first generation 
sequencing.  
When combining NGS sequencing technology with environmental samples, also known 
as metagenomics (see above), a highly processive form of shotgun sequencing in which any and 
all nucleic acids in a sample are potential candidates for sequencing templates is observed (Jones 
2010; Tyson et al. 2004). This methodology has been applied to several types of environmental 
samples including seawater, bilge water, marines, intestinal tracts of various animals and 
contaminated water sources (Tyson et al. 2004; Daniel 2005; Breitbart et al. 2003; Gill et al. 
2006; Tringe and Rubin 2005). In theory, NGS combined with metagenomic methodology could 
be applied to disease diagnostics as a means to search for unknown pathogens. Similar, 
combined, NGS and metagenomics approaches have been applied to the detection of known and 
unknown plant viruses in mammals, insects and plants (Adams et al. 2009, Roossinck et al. 2009, 
Cox-Foster et al., 2007; Palacios et al., 2008).  
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The amount of data (400MB – 28GB) produced from an NGS run is computationally 
demanding and requires computer clusters to assemble (Metzker 2010; Reis-Filho 2009). The 
cost of building and maintaining computer cluster systems can be too high for many research 
labs. A metagenomic approach used for pathogen detection will contain a majority of sequence 
from the host, which results in pathogen sequence making up a small percentage of the total reads 
(Roossinck et al. 2009; Adams et al. 2009). For a diagnostician, the host sequences that make up 
most of a plant metagenome sample are essentially irrelevant. What is important for diagnostician 
is the ability to capture a genomic overview of everything in the sample, which can then be 
screened for the presence of pathogen genomic fragments. The positive identification of pathogen 
genomic material obtained from a NGS run would result in confirmation of a pathogen being 
present.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Xanthomonas oryzae pathovars oryzae (Xoo) and oryzicola: major diseases, host tissues 
colonized and global distribution. 
 
 
Bacteria 
Disease 
Area of plant 
infected 
Distribution 
Xanthomonas oryzae 
pv. oryzae 
Bacterial leaf 
blight (BLB)  
Bacterial blight 
(BB)  
Kresek  
Vascular tissue - 
characterized by 
marginal leaf lesions 
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, 
Africa, Mexico, U.S. 
(Xoo-like bacterium)  
Central America, 
Caribbean, South 
America, Australia  
Xanthomonas oryzae 
pv. oryzicola 
Bacterial leaf 
streak (BLS) 
Parenchyma cells -  
characterized by leaf 
streaking 
Asia, Africa, Australia 
The information in the table above was gathered from:  
CABI, EPPO. 1997. Data sheets on quarantine pests; Xanthomonas oryzae. and  
Triplett L, et al. 2011. Appl Environ Microbiol 12:3930-3937. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Prokaryotic plant pathogens discussed in this study.  
 
Pathogen NCBI accession # Notes 
Xylella fastidiosa 9a5c 
NC_002488.3 
NC_002489 
NC_002490 
Causal agent of citrus variegated 
chlorosis (CVC) 
Xanthomonas oryzae pv. 
oryzae PXO99A 
NC_010717.1 Causal agent of leaf blight 
Ralstonia solanacearum race 
3 biovar 2 (UW551) 
*GCA_000167955.1 Causal agent of brown rot  
Candidatus Liberibacter 
asiaticus 
NC_012985.3 
Causal agent of citrus greening 
‘Huanglongbing’ 
Pseudomonas syringae pv. 
tomato DC3000 
NC_004578.1 
NC_004633.1 
NC_004632.1 
Causal agent of bacterial speck  
*Genome not fully assembled 
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Table 3. Ralstonia solanacearum races, biovars, hosts and geographical distribution.  
 
Ralstonia solanacearum species complex 
Race Biovar Host 
Geographical 
Distribution 
1 1,3,4 Wide 
Asia, Australia, 
Americas 
2 1 Banana 
Caribbean, Brazil, 
Philippines 
3 2 
Potato, Tomato, 
Geranium & other 
species 
Global except for the 
U.S. & Canada 
4 3,4 Ginger Asia 
5 5 Mulberry China 
The information in the table aove was athered from: 
Daughtrey M. 2007. Southern bacterial wilt, caused by Ralstonia solanacearum.  
Denny T, Hayward A. 2001. Laboratory Guide for the Identification of Plant Pathogenic 
Bacteria.3
rd
 ed. APS Press 
Lemay A, et al. 2003. Pest data sheet: Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 biovar 2.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
E-PROBE DIAGNOSTIC NUCLEIC ACID ANALYSIS (EDNA): A THEORETICAL 
APPROACH FOR HANDLING OF NEXT GENERATION SEQUENCING DATA FOR 
DIAGNOSTICS 
PUBLISHED WORK 
This chapter is a published peer-reviewed manuscript with modifications to fit the thesis format 
of Oklahoma State University’s Graduate College requirements.   The manuscript is reproduced 
in its entirety with the permission of the Journal of Microbiological Methods. My contributions to 
the manuscript were the work on prokaryotic plant pathogens and significant portions of 
background information included in the introduction, pathogen detection assays, and 
metagenomics. Co-authors Anthony Stobbe and Andres Espindola performed the portions of the 
work on viruses and eukaryotic plant pathogens. To all co-authors, they have my thanks and 
acknowledgments for their contributions.  
Stobbe A, Daniels J, Espindola A, Ruchi V, Melcher U, Ochoa-Corona F, Garzon C, Fletcher J, 
Schneider W. 2013. E-probe diagnostic nucleic acid analysis (EDNA): A theoretical approach for 
handling of next generation sequencing data for diagnostics. J Microbiol Meth 94:356-366. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
E-PROBE DIAGNOSTIC NUCLEIC ACID ANALYSIS (EDNA): A THEORETICAL 
APPROACH FOR HANDLING OF NEXT GENERATION SEQUENCING DATA FOR 
DIAGNOSTICS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Plant biosecurity requires rapid identification of pathogenic organisms. While there are many 
pathogen-specific diagnostic assays, the ability to test for large numbers of pathogens 
simultaneously is lacking. Next generation sequencing (NGS) allows one to detect all organisms 
within a given sample, but has computational limitations during assembly and similarity 
searching of sequence data which extend the time needed to make a diagnostic decision. To 
minimize the amount of bioinformatic processing time needed, unique pathogen-specific 
sequences (termed e-probes) were designed to be used in searches of unassembled, non-quality 
checked, sequence data. E-probes have been designed and tested for several select 
phytopathogens, including an RNA virus, a DNA virus, bacteria, fungi, and an oomycete, 
illustrating the ability to detect several diverse plant pathogens. E-probes of 80 or more 
nucleotides in length provided satisfactory levels of precision (75%). The number of e-probes 
designed for each pathogen varied with the genome size of the pathogen. To give confidence to 
diagnostic calls, a statistical method of determining the presence of a given pathogen was 
developed, in which target e-probe signals (detection signal) are compared to signals generate by
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 a decoy set of e-probes (background signal). The E-probe Diagnostic Nucleic acid Assay 
(EDNA) process provides the framework for a new sequence-based detection system that 
eliminates the need for assembly of NGS data. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural biosecurity is a priority for ensuring uninterrupted international and 
interstate trade, which in turn ensures an abundant food supply. With increased movement of 
commodities across state and national borders, the risk of introduction of exotic plant pathogens 
has risen significantly over the past few decades (Gamliel et al. 2008). To compound this risk, the 
lag time from pathogen introduction to appearance of disease symptoms provides opportunity for 
diseases to spread, limiting abilities for containment and eradication (Gamliel et al. 2008). 
Particularly for plant pathogens, for which vaccines are impossible and post infection therapies 
are limited and expensive, early detection and correct diagnoses are critical. Currently, plant 
pathogens are detected primarily by immunoassays, such as enzyme-linked immunosorbance 
assay (ELISA) and immune-strip tests, and nucleic acid based assays, such as real time PCR or 
microarray hybridization (Schaad et al. 2003). Immunoassays are relatively simple and quick, but 
may lack both the level of sensitivity required for agrosecurity applications and the ability to 
detect multiple pathogen species in a single assay (Schaad et al. 2003; Postnikova et al. 2008).  
Nucleic acid based techniques for detection and identification of plant pathogens, such as end-
point polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and quantitative real-time PCR (qPCR) are more sensitive 
and selective than immunoassays, but they too may be limited in the number of pathogenic 
organisms that can be detected simultaneously (Postnikova et al. 2008). Both immunoassays and 
nucleic acid-based tests require previous characterization of the pathogen on either the protein or 
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sequence level, and therefore lack the ability to detect uncharacterized plant pathogens. Although 
individual pathogen nucleic acid and immunoassays are readily available, current screening 
methods have limited ability to detect multiple plant pathogens concurrently in an efficient and 
cost effective manner. DNA microarrays, PCR-electrospray ionization/MS, multilocus 
sequencing typing, and simple sequence repeat assays all have the capacity to search for multiple 
pathogens and/or multiple diagnostic targets, but require existing pathogen characterization, 
which relies upon continuous development and maintenance of reference databases (Schaad et al. 
2003; Postnikova et al. 2008).  
Next generation sequencing (NGS) is a relatively recent technology that allows for the 
generation of very large amounts of sequence data from a given sample (Ronaghi 2001). Because 
various NGS platform technologies differ in read length (20 bp to approximately 1000 bp) and in 
the total number of reads (100,000 to 1 million), the amount of overall sequence data produced 
varies widely (Tucker et al., 2009). The productivity of NGS technology far exceeds that of 
traditional Sanger sequencing (Pop and Salzberg 2008; Magi et al. 2010; Metzker 2010). NGS of 
environmental samples has enabled the field of metagenomics, in which any and all nucleic acids 
in a sample are potential candidates for sequencing templates. Thus, NGS generates a sequencing 
profile that represents any and all organisms present within the sample (Jones 2010; Tyson et al. 
2004). Metagenomics has been applied to several types of environmental samples including, 
seawater, ship bilge water, intestinal tracts of various animals and contaminated environments 
such as acid mine drainage systems (Tyson et al. 2004; Daniel 2005; Breitbart et al. 2003; Gill et 
al. 2006; Tringe and Rubin 2005). A metagenomic approach also could be applied to disease 
diagnostics, providing the benefit that NGS could detect any and all microbes in a given sample. 
A metagenomic approach has already been used to detect previously unknown pathogens in a 
variety of organisms, including mammals, insects, and plants (Adams et al. 2009; Cox-Foster et 
al. 2007; Palacios et al. 2008). In addition, NGS can be used to discover unknown pathogens and 
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microbes, and has already been applied to the detection of both known and unknown plant viruses 
(Adams et al. 2009; Roossinck et al. 2010).   
The advantage of NGS over other sequencing technologies is the volume (400MB – 
28GB) of data generated (Metzker 2010; Reis-Filho  2009). From a different perspective, the 
volumes of data generated by NGS could be a detriment to a diagnostician, as bioinformatic 
processing becomes a limiting factor in high throughput applications (Pop and Salzberg 2008; 
Magi et al. 2010). For example, consider 200 liters of seawater containing over 5000 different 
viruses (Breitbart et al. 2002).  If a metagenomics approach is used for plant pathogen detection 
within this sample, plant pathogen-specific sequences will likely make up only a small percentage 
of the total reads (Adams et al. 2009; Roossinck et al. 2010). In contrast, plants infected with 
viruses may have a much higher percentage of the total nucleic acid comprised of pathogen 
sequences (Kreuze et al. 2009). The host sequences that would make up the majority of an 
infected plant metagenome sample are essentially unimportant for diagnosis.  
The novel assay developed in this research (Figure 1), and reported herein, termed E-
probe Detection of Nucleic acid Analysis (EDNA), is a bioinformatic pipeline that minimizes and 
ignores irrelevant sequence data thereby focusing on specific pathogen-associated sequences. 
Mock sample databases (MSDs), simulating 454-pyrosequencing runs from plant pathogen 
infected plants, were generated. Rather than assessing the presence or absence of pathogens by 
BLAST of all sequences against a curated database, such as the nucleotide sequence databases of 
GenBank, the NGS metagenomic data was assessed using pathogen unique sequences termed 
target e-probes, incorporating local BLAST searches of designed e-probes against databases of 
raw sequence reads on local computer systems.  This modified bioinformatics approach resulted 
in the rapid detection of pathogen-associated sequences without extensive analysis of the 
metagenome. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS  
Pathogens and their sequences  
The plant pathogens studied here belong to three general groups, viral, prokaryotic, and 
eukaryotic pathogens. The chosen systems represent a wide variety of plant pathogens and have 
global economic importance (Table 1).  Two viruses were used: Plum pox virus, a single stranded 
RNA virus, and Bean golden mosaic virus, which is a bipartite DNA virus. Prokaryotic pathogens 
included Xylella fastidiosa 9a5c, the causal bacterium of citrus variegated chlorosis, 
Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzae, which causes bacterial blight in rice, and Ralstonia 
solanacearum race 3 biovar 2, a select agent that causes wilting of a variety of crops including 
potatoes and tomatoes, Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus, a bacterium responsible for citrus 
greening, and Spiroplasma citri, which causes citrus stubborn disease. Eukaryotic pathogens 
included: Puccinia graminis a rust fungus, causing the stem rust of wheat and affecting a very 
broad host range including 365 cereals and grasses in 54 genera (Hodson et al., 2005); 
Phytophthora ramorum, a stramenopile with a wide host range of 23 species in 12 plant families 
(Rizzo, 2003; Tyler et al. 2006); and Phakopsora pachyrhizi, which causes soybean rust, a 
widespread pathogen that now can be found in Africa, Asia, Australia, South America and 
Hawaii (Miles et al. 2003). For each pathogen, a near neighbor was chosen based on a close 
phylogenetic relationship, and the availability of complete genome sequence (Table 1). 
Grapevine, Vitis vinifera (GenBank: PRJNA33471), was chosen as the host background due to 
the availability of its genome sequence, and its genome size, which is within the range of those of 
full plant genomes. While grapevine is not a natural host for many of the chosen pathogens, it 
serves well as an example of background sequences in which the target pathogen sequences exist.  
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Experimental Flow 
The principle behind EDNA is to minimize the bioinformatic processing by eliminating 
post-sequencing assembly, quality checks, and extensive BLAST searching of individual 
sequence reads. Rather than a traditional metagenome-based analysis of sequencing data, a simple 
sample database composed of raw unassembled sequence reads is generated. E-probes are then 
used to query the sequence database to assess the presence or absence of the target pathogen, in 
effect simulating a microarray or traditional hybridization assay in silico.   
E-Probe Design 
Pathogen-specific sequence queries were designed using a modified version of the Tool 
for Oligonucleotide Fingerprint Identification (TOFI) (Vijaya Satya et al. 2008). The basic TOFI 
pipeline includes three basic steps: comparison of pathogen sequences with those of near 
neighbors, thermodynamics optimization, and a BLAST search check for uniqueness. The EDNA 
query design process is similar, with the following changes. For in silico querying, the e-probe 
thermodynamics optimization step is omitted because the thermodynamic properties of the unique 
sequences are irrelevant.  Parameters of interest to a BLAST search and/or important to a 
successful NGS run were added in its place. In the BLAST parameter step, the query sequence 
length was restricted to standardize e-values from the BLAST search and candidate e-probes 
containing a homo-oligomer (five or more of the same nucleotide in tandem) were removed 
because of the inherent miscalling of homo-oligomers in many NGS platforms. To test the 
optimal length of e-probes the BLAST check step was omitted, and the preliminary e-probes were 
used in the optimization of e-probe length. After optimization of e-probe length, a BLAST check 
and manual editing were reintroduced to assure specificity (Table 1). Any e-probes that hit a 
species different than the target with an E-value of 1x10-10 or below were removed from the final 
e-probe set.  
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 Near neighbor comparisons were conducted as published (Vijaya Satya et al. 2008) with 
a maximum number of gaps equal to zero, a minimum probe length equal to 20 nt, and a 
maximum probe length equal to 4000 nt. The near neighbor selection was performed based on 
two criteria: complete genome availability in NCBI Genbank and close relationship to the target 
pathogen. The BLAST parameter step has two possible variables, the length of the designed 
query and the number of nucleotides that would be considered a homo-oligomer. A range of 
query lengths were designed, at intervals of 20 (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, and 140) nucleotides, 
while the number of nucleotides considered to be a homo-oligomer was held constant at five. 
Mock database construction 
To test the designed queries, a data set consisting of both known host and pathogen 
genome segments was generated. Simulation of massively parallel sequencing was performed 
using MetaSim software (Vijaya Satya et al. 2008). The simulation includes planned mistakes in 
base calling, as well as a range of read lengths, both of which are common for 454, or Illumina 
sequencing. The resulting databases contained 10,000 simulated reads, each approximately 400 ± 
30 nucleotides, or 62 nucleotides, respectively. Abundance values (representing the given amount 
of nucleic acid within a sample) for host genomic sequences were set at a default of 100, while 
host mitochondrial and chloroplast sequences were given an abundance value of 1000, meaning 
that for every genomic sequence there will be 10 mitochondrial and chloroplast sequences. This 
value was chosen arbitrarily. Pathogen abundance values were varied to generate a number of 
reads corresponding to the percent of the database that is made up of pathogen sequences (i.e. 
25% pathogen sequences is equivalent to 2500 pathogen reads in a 10,000 read database). The 
databases were placed into categories based on the pathogen sequence percentage: those with 15-
25% pathogen sequences were considered high, with 5-15% medium, with 0.5-5% low, and with 
less than 0.5% very low. These percentages were chosen arbitrarily. Each category contained 
three databases, which were considered as replicates within the category.  
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Querying Mock Databases 
MSDs were queried using BLASTn with an e-value set at 50. Pathogen-specific e-probe 
sets were used as queries, and the MSDs served as reference databases. A match was defined as 
an instance where an individual e-probe was found in an MSD, such that the total number of 
matches must be equal to or less than the total number of e-probes. A hit was defined as any 
instance where a MSD read had a counterpart e-probe. A single match could be made up of 
multiple hits. Once the query search was conducted, the data was parsed according to different e-
values thresholds to find an e-value threshold with minimal false positives, with steps at 1x10
-3
, 
1x10
-6
, and 1x10
-9
. 
The decision to designate a sample as positive or negative for a pathogen is crucial for 
any diagnostic assay. The criterion used to determine a positive sample in this assay was the 
presence of pathogen-specific sequences. It was likely that many of these sequences would be 
similar to sequences that belong to either the plant host, or to a different microbe that resides in 
the sample. Each e-probe set is designed to be unique to a specific pathogen. The signals of these 
sets were compared to the signals of decoy sets, which represent background signal. To generate 
a decoy set of e-probes, the designed target set of e-probes was reversed in sequence. Each set 
was then used as queries in a BLASTn search against the MSD. Each probe in both sets was 
given a score based on the e-value and the percent coverage of the top n hit(s), where n equals 
[50, 10, 5, 1]. 
 The two sets of scores were then compared using a T-test. Three tiers of diagnostic calls 
were used in the statistical test, positive (p-value <= 0.05), suspect (p-value <=0.1) and negative 
(p value > 0.1).  No significant difference between the two sets indicated no evidence for the 
presence of pathogen sequences, and the sample was designated negative for the pathogen. 
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RESULTS  
General 
Plant pathogenic query production was analyzed in relation to genome size for two 
viruses, five bacteria, two fungi and one stramenopile. The targeted viral (Plum pox virus and 
Bean golden mosaic virus), fungal (Puccinia graminis and Phakopsora pachyrhizi) and 
stramenopile (Phytophthora ramorum) plant pathogens were compared to near neighbors of the 
same species. For the bacteria, the Ca. Liberibacter asiaticus near neighbor was from the same 
species, while those of the other 3 bacteria were from a closely related species (X. oryzae paired 
with X. fastidiosa and vice versa). Fungal pathogens Puccinia graminis and Phakopsora 
pachyrhizi had the same near neighbor, Puccinia triticina. In addition, P. pachyrhizi was found to 
be broadly similar in biological attributes to P. triticina (Pivonia and Yang, 2006). In the case of 
Phytophthora ramorum, P. infestans was used as near neighbor (Table 1). The lack of a 
spiroplasma related to S. citri resulted in the selection of a near neighbor that was related at the 
order level (Table 1). The genome sizes of the pathogens used ranged from 5.23 knt to 88 Mnt, 
and the number of queries ranged from 4 to 21,790. As the genome size of the plant pathogen 
increased so did the total number of queries for the targeted pathogen. The total length of the 
combined e-probes was proportional to the total number of e-probes, and to the genome size. The 
percentage of genome covered ranged from 1.74 to 6.57 without any correlation with genome size 
or total query number (Table 1).  
The number of hits at a threshold of 1x10-3, 1x10-6, or 1x10-9 received for each 
pathogen was determined (Figures 2-4). The number of positive hits rose with the size of the 
pathogen genome. As expected, the number of hits increased also with increasing pathogen 
proportions. At lower proportions, there was an increase in the standard deviation of the number 
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of hits. A general similarity of the number of hits can be seen for each pathogen type, with 
prokaryotic pathogens having the greatest variability across pathogens.   
The number of matches was compared to pathogen abundance in the MSDs. A match was 
defined as a single query found within a MSD, such that one match could represent multiple hits.  
As the pathogen abundance increased, the number of matches increased, as expected. The number 
of hits was nearly always greater than the number of matches, demonstrating that single queries 
frequently generated multiple hits in a MSD (Figures 5-7). The number of prokaryotic pathogen 
e-probe matches was related to the number of e-probes available for the pathogen, in other words, 
the more e-probes designed for a given pathogen, the more matches were attained in a BLAST 
search. For example, a Ca. L. asiaticus e-probe set of 80 nt length consists of 502 e-probes, and 
when queried with a low pathogen ratio MSD, received 169 matches. X. oryzae contained 2597 e-
probes with 345 matches. In contrast, the number of matches for P. ramorum (1645) was less 
than the number of matches for P. graminis (1998), despite the greater number of queries for the 
former. For the viral pathogens a match was found for every query available in high, normal and 
low pathogen abundance MSDs, and the number of matches in very low abundance MSDs was 
approximately half of the number of available queries (2 matches/ 4 e-probes in the case of 
BGMV) (Figures 5-7, Table 1). 
Optimization of e-probe length 
To determine the optimum e-probe length, precision was calculated for each of the e-
probe sets (Table 2), in which each hit is either a true positive (a pairing of e-probe and pathogen 
sequence), or false positive (a pairing of e-probe and non-pathogen sequence). We calculated the 
precision as the number of pathogenic hits (True positive) divided by the total number of hits (hits 
to pathogen or hits to host). For each of the pathogens, e-probe lengths below 80 nt were 
substandard (precision less than 75%) as queries of very low pathogen ratio (<0.5%) MSDs. Viral 
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e-probe sets had high precision, most likely due to the minimal similarity between viral and 
eukaryotic sequences. For prokaryotic and eukaryotic pathogens, at abundances greater than 
0.5%, the specificity was greater than 80.4% at any e-probe length. With the very low abundance 
MSDs, the precision varied between 14.1 and 100%.  
The effect of varying e-probe lengths from 20 – 140 nt on the matches generated by 
searches on the MSDs was determined. As expected, for each pathogen, match numbers 
decreased as the length of the e-probes increased, because the number of longer e-probes 
designed was much lower than that for shorter e-probes. In general, each pathogen type (virus, 
bacterial, and eukaryotic) had a similar number of matches for each member within a group 
(Figures 5-7). One exception was X. oryzae, which showed no such downward trend (Figure 6). 
Almost all pathogens were detected using every query length. The other exception was R. 
solanacearum in very low pathogen abundance MSDs, in which an average of a single match was 
found for the majority of query lengths (40, 80, 100, 120, and 140 nt). P. ramorum and P. 
graminis showed the smallest number of matches of all the pathogens when very low pathogen 
proportion MSDs were queried with 140 nt e-probes. This low number of matches could be due 
to the random selection of sequences when constructing MSDs because fungal and stramenopile 
genomes are larger than viral and bacterial genomes, allowing the presence of portions of the 
genome in the MSDs that have a low density of e-probe sequences. This phenomenon is most 
likely to occur for low pathogen proportions and large pathogen genomes.  
E-value threshold 
All four categories of mock databases (high, medium, low, and very low) were queried 
using the 80 nt e-probes for all of the target pathogens.  Pathogens reads were detected via e-
probe based BLAST search routinely with a threshold e-value of 1x10-3. Using 80 nt queries, all 
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of the pathogens also were detected in very low abundance databases, in some but not all 
replicates (Figures 2-4, Supplemental Table 1).  
Some e-probes generated false positive matches, i.e. instances when the e-probe sequence 
found a host counterpart in the MSD. The number of false positive matches was directly related 
to the e-values used in the BLASTn searches of the MSDs, with higher e-values generating more 
false positives. Overall, the eukaryotic pathogen simulations with a threshold e-value of 1x10-3 
generated the highest number of false positive matches and hits (Supplemental Table 1). Bacterial 
pathogen simulations also generated false positives; however these were fewer (5 or fewer per 
database). No false positives at a threshold e-value of 1x10-3 were observed in viral MSDs. The 
e-value was adjusted during the parsing step by using three different threshold e-values of 1x10-
3, 1x10-6, and 1x10-9. When the pathogens were analyzed using lower e-values, the number of 
false positives per database decreased from an average of 1 for prokaryotic e-probe sets, and 8 for 
eukaryotic e-probe sets to 0 for both.  
Using the threshold values of either 1x10-6 or 1x10-9 also decreased the total number of 
matches and hits; particularly for fungal pathogens, i.e. for P. graminis, the number of matches 
decreased from 1998 matches (e-value of 1x10-3) to 1530 matches (1x10-9). Among prokaryotic 
pathogens, the greatest decrease in total matches and hits was observed with X. oryzae, which 
decreased from 2597 to 1832 at e-values of 1x10-3 to 1x10-9, respectively. This difference of 765 
fewer e-probes did not lessen the effectiveness of pathogen detection. Instead it decreased the 
number of false positives due to the greater stringency placed on the bioinformatics system.  For 
viruses, the total number of matches was not affected by increased stringency (lower e-values); 
however the total number of hits was reduced with lower e-value BLASTn (Supplementary Table 
2). Mock sample databases also were generated using read lengths of 62 nt and with the error 
model found for a typical Illumina run (Richter et al., 2008). EDNA analysis showed similar 
results to the 454 simulations (data not shown).  
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BLAST check comparison 
False positives were reduced in number by removing e-probes that have similarity to 
known sequences in NCBI. Each 80 nt e-probe set was used as queries in a search against the 
NCBI GenBank nt database. E-probes with hits at an e-value of 1x10-10 or lower were removed 
from the probe set. This decreased the number of probes per set by up to 50% (Table 1).  
Comparing the performance of BLAST-checked e-probe sets showed a slight reduction in the 
number of false positive hits, with a larger reduction in the number of matches and total hits 
(Supplemental Table 1).   
Determination of Positive and Negatives 
Using the above method, we were able to correctly call samples positive for all positive 
samples except for those at a very low abundance (<0.5% pathogen reads) (Table 3). At this 
abundance there were mixed results, at times calling the sample positive while other times calling 
it negative. R. solanacearum was not detected in very low abundance MSDs. Pathogen negative 
MSDs (MSDs without pathogens) were all negative or suspect for viruses, S. citri, and R. 
solanacearum. False positives were most common in eukaryotic pathogens. When the number of 
top hits (n in equation 1) was lowered in the scoring step, the pathogen negative MSDs were 
correctly identified in some, but not all, replicates (Table 3).     
Discussion 
There are multiple advantages to using a metagenomics-based approach to pathogen 
diagnostics. Advances in NGS have made it possible to generate billions of bases of sequence for 
any given sample, creating metagenomes that represent a complete profile of all organisms in a 
given nucleic acid sample, including host, endophytes and pathogens (Jones, 2010; Tyson et al., 
2004). This presents the very real probability that any and all microbes in any given sample could 
be identified. Metagenomics approaches have been used in multiple instances to suggest the cause 
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of unknown diseases (Adams et al. 2009; Cox-Foster et al. 2007; Palacios et al. 2008), but two 
factors would seem to preclude the use of metagenomic sequencing as an everyday diagnostic 
tool. 
The first detriment to adopting metagenomics-based diagnostics is the current per run 
cost. The typical approach to a metagenome diagnosis is nucleic acid extraction, sequencing, 
sequence assembly, and BLAST analysis of the assembled contigs. An examination of recent 
history suggests that sequencing technologies will likely become less expensive, due to the 
technologies becoming faster, more accessible and the sequencing more processive over time, 
outpacing Moore’s Law. This prediction suggests that NGS costs may not be a long term 
restraint, particularly when combined with barcoding (Parameswaran et al. 2007). However, the 
very same advances that drive down per sample costs of sequencing create additional data 
handling problems. As NGS becomes less expensive, faster and the length of reads increases, the 
number of bases sequenced in a single run will increase exponentially. These same advances in 
NGS will have an additional exponential growth effect on the databases (i.e. GenBank and its 
subsidiaries) that are used for the BLAST searching of sequence data, suggesting that the current 
metagenomic approach to pathogen diagnostics will eventually become too computationally 
intensive for everyday use. 
The objective of this work was to find a simplified bioinformatic approach for dealing 
with the exponential growth and complexity of NGS metagenome data, which could be handled 
on a standard personal computer without extensive computational delays. To do this, we 
developed a protocol (EDNA) in which the input NGS data would be treated as the searchable 
database, and this sequence database would be queried by diagnostic signature sequences (e-
probes) without the need for assembly or quality checks. This approach allows the user to limit 
and control both the size of the searchable database and the size of the searching query set. 
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The EDNA approach was tested using a series of MSDs representing potential 
metagenomes with pathogen sequences in a plant background. Representatives of multiple 
taxonomic groups of plant pathogens were used, including an RNA virus, a DNA virus, a 
spiroplasma, prokaryotes, a stramenopile, and a fungus. Diagnostic e-probe sequences were 
selected at a range of lengths, and used to query MSDs with differing levels of pathogen 
abundance (from 0.5% pathogen reads to 25% pathogen reads). EDNA was successful at 
detecting all pathogens at low, medium and high levels (everything above 0.5% pathogen reads in 
the MSD). The number of matches (any instance where an individual e-probe finds a counterpart 
or counterparts in the database) and hits (cumulative total of e-probe/counterpart finds) were 
correlated to the number of e-probes available for a pathogen, to the pathogen abundance, to the 
E-value threshold used when parsing the data, and inversely correlated to the length of the e-
probes. Below the low pathogen threshold, the EDNA results were mixed, suggesting that EDNA 
has a threshold of detection in its current format. However it should be noted that the limit of 
detection could be improved to suit user needs by adjusting the number of e-probes, the length of 
the e-probes and/or the parsing E-value. 
Not surprisingly, EDNA generated some false positive hits and matches. The number of 
false positives appeared to remain relatively the same regardless of the pathogen abundance 
(Supplemental Table 1), and were problematic only in the very low abundance MSDs. Viruses 
were completely free of false positives at all concentrations of pathogen reads, which might be 
expected considering the lack of related sequences in the host setting. Prokaryotes have 
chloroplast and mitochondrial counterparts in the host MSD, and there were occasional false 
positive hits and matches using prokaryotic e-probes. Overall, eukaryotic pathogen e-probes were 
the most problematic, as might be expected when confronted with a eukaryotic host background. 
Very low pathogen abundance simulations were not distinguished from pathogen-free MSDs, and 
generated the highest number of false positive matches and hits. However, EDNA is flexible 
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enough to generate higher precision, by raising the E-value threshold required for calling a 
positive hit. Both P. graminis and P. ramorum showed fewer (zero or one) false positive hits 
when the E-value was lowered to 1x10
-9
, and the prokaryotic pathogen e-probes were completely 
specific when the parsing E-value was lowered to 1x10
-6
. Larger, more complex genomes and the 
conservation of genes and sequences between pathogen and host (eukaryotic pathogens) require 
lower E-value cutoff levels. It should also be noted that some of the near neighbors were less 
related to the target organisms, a limitation driven by the lack of available sequenced genomes. 
Improved near neighbors, which should become available as more pathogen genomes are 
sequenced, will also improve precision. 
A second approach for improving specificity involved improving the screening of 
potential e-probes. Clearly, as genome size increases the number of e-probes generated increases 
in proportion. Removal of a number of e-probes from the larger pathogen genome screens would 
likely not affect the overall limit of detection. The e-probes from all pathogens were searched 
against GenBank, as is done in primer selection, to eliminate a number of false positive 
generating e-probes. This strategy may be of limited use for plant pathogens, however, as the 
majority of environmental microbes in a typical plant metagenome have no GenBank counterpart 
(Pivonia and Yang 2006). The addition of a healthy control BLAST, searching healthy control 
asymptomatic host environmental sample sequence databases for the presence of potential false 
positive queries might eliminate some e-probes that would react to host or endophyte sequences 
not available in GenBank. Regardless, much like limit of detection, EDNA precision could be 
adjusted up or down as needed in the e-probe design (by adjusting e-probe length or near 
neighbor selection) or during database searching (adjusting E-value threshold). As an added 
advantage, adjusting E-value threshold and choosing “general” e-probes could allow for 
searching for related organisms that are not the specific target organism. 
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A key to any diagnostic method is determining the level of positive “signal” necessary to 
confirm that a pathogen is present in a given sample. For molecular techniques such as PCR, the 
presence or absence of a product is easily distinguished. However when the positive/negative 
decision is based on a quantitative measurement, such as fluorescence or absorbance in ELISA, 
the determination involves some level of statistical analysis. The number of matches and hits 
returned from a sequence database query within the proposed EDNA concept is not entirely 
dissimilar to these quantitative approaches, in which it is critical to distinguish between a true 
signal (e.g. matches that represent pathogen sequences) and a false “signal” (e.g. matches where 
query sequence is identical or nearly identical to non-pathogen sequence). In ELISA, a common 
approach is to make a diagnostic decision by comparing the fluorescence value of a sample well 
to those of a set of negative control wells, with a cutoff defined as a certain number of standard 
deviations over background. To utilize a similar approach for NGS, a basal level of false positives 
(erroneous query matches) was determined. Decoy probe sets were developed for every pathogen, 
and these decoy e-probe sets were used to determine the chances that a relatively random 
sequence would find a counterpart in a eukaryotic host background by chance. The decoy 
comparison method was particularly successful with virus pathogens, and less successful with 
eukaryotic pathogens. This finding indicates that statistical approaches could be developed to 
assess the accuracy of positive/negative determinations in NGS-based diagnostics. As in other 
diagnostic assays, the balance between specificity and limit of detection is a necessity in this 
bioinformatics approach to diagnostics.   
The theoretical ability of next generation sequencing coupled with bioinformatics to 
detect highly consequential plant pathogens (EDNA), at varying abundances, and in a complex 
host sample was validated. The advantage of the EDNA system is that it can be adjusted or 
designed to address a range of applications and/or the scientific needs in a variety of fields 
including bioinformatics, epidemiology, detection and diagnostics of human, animal, and plant 
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pathogens, monitoring and surveillance, quarantine, and microbial forensics. EDNA alleviates the 
computational work load routinely associated with classic metagenomic assembly and BLAST-
based approaches; allowing plant pathologists to use personal computers for running 
bioinformatic pipelines without investing in large and expensive cluster systems of bioinformatic 
infrastructure. The EDNA approach could be usable for all types of pathogens in all types of 
hosts, and could work with any NGS platform. The flexibility given by the possibility to 
periodically modify or build custom tailored databases of e-probe sets plus the lower 
computational requirements favor the implementation of endless applications limited only by the 
imagination of the scientific community. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Comparison of the amount of genome coverage of e-probes across tested pathogens. 
Name 
NCBI 
accession # 
Near Neighbor 
NCBI  
accession # 
Original 
Sequence 
Size (kb) 
# 80nt 
e-
probes 
Total 
kbps 
Genome 
% 
coverage 
Bean golden mosaic 
virus 
NC_004042 Abutilon mosaic virus NC_001928 5.23 4 0.32 6.12% 
NC_004043 
 
NC_001929 
    
Plum pox virus NC_001445 Pepper mottle virus NC_001517 9.74 8 0.64 6.57% 
Spiroplasma citri 
115252846, 110005886 Mycobacterium bovis NC_008769 1525.76 423 33.84 2.22% 
110005766, 110005758 
      
11000748, 110005735 
      
110005716, 110005696 
      
110005687, 110005683 
      
110005675, 110005664 
      
110005652, 110005641 
      
110005622, 110005605 
      
110005592, 110005560 
      
110005522, 110005436 
      
110005327, 110005285 
      
110005260, 110005199 
      
110005145, 110005138 
      
110005098, 110005060 
      
110005027, 110004948 
      
110004868, 110004796 
      
110004744, 110004631 
      
110004607, 110004455 
      
110004127, 110004055 
      
110003907M 
      
Ca. L. asiaticus NC_012985 
Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens 
AE007869  1226.70 114 9.12 0.74% 
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Name 
NCBI 
accession # 
Near Neighbor 
NCBI  
accession # 
Original 
Sequence 
Size (kb) 
# 80nt 
e-
probes 
Total 
kbps 
Genome 
% 
coverage 
Xanthomonas oryzae CP000967 Xylella fastidiosa  
NC_002488 
2679.31 1459 116.72 4.36% NC_002489 
NC_002490 
Xylella fastidiosa 
NC_002488 
Xanthomonas oryzae CP000967 5240.08 2597 207.76 3.96% NC_002489 
NC_002490 
Ralstonia 
solanacearum 
NC_003295 
NC_003296 
Ralstonia pickettii 
NC_010682 
NC_010678 
NC_010683 
3716.41 1418 113.44 3.05% 
Puccinia graminis 
AAWC01000001 
AAWC01004563 
Puccinia triticina 
ADAS01000001 
ADAS01038776 
66652.40 20573 1645.84 2.47% 
Phytophora ramorum 
AAQX01000001 
AAQX01007589 
Phytophora infestants 
AATU01000001 
AATU01018288  
88644.63 21790 1743.2 1.97% 
 
Continuation of Table 1 from page 56. 
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Table 2. Table showing the precision (in percentage) at varying probe lengths and different 
pathogenic concentrations. 
 
 
Name 
E-probe 
length 
15-25% 5-15% .05-5% < 0.5% 
Bean golden mosaic 
virus 
  
20 100 100 100 100 
40 100 100 100 100 
60 100 99.97 100 100 
80 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 
120 100 100 100 100 
140 100 100 100 100 
Plum pox virus  
20 100 100 100 100 
40 100 100 100 100 
60 100 100 100 100 
80 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 
120 100 100 100 100 
140 100 100 100 100 
Spiroplasma citri  
20 97.66 94.32 80.38 33.36 
40 98.89 98.14 91.37 51.1 
60 98.94 98.75 93.91 54.44 
80 99.56 99.38 96.2 78.59 
100 99.73 99.03 93.37 72.44 
120 99.78 99.28 97.4 68.33 
140 99.53 98.84 99.02 63.89 
Ca. L. asiaticus  
20 98.97 98.31 92.42 55.58 
40 99.48 99.27 96.35 54.79 
60 99.26 98.72 96.42 62.05 
80 99.74 99.84 98.06 81.24 
100 99.63 99.05 96.44 63.49 
120 99.49 99.33 97.17 57.08 
140 99.33 99.12 96.47 40.12 
Xanthomonas oryzae  
20 99.96 100 99.58 84.2 
40 100 99.78 99.58 87.91 
60 99.95 99.81 99.51 84.21 
80 99.93 99.95 99.87 93.72 
100 99.98 99.89 99.87 93.91 
120 99.9 99.89 99.86 94.57 
140 99.98 99.95 99.87 100 
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Name 
E-probe 
length 
15-25% 5-15% .05-5% < 0.5% 
Xylella fastidiosa  
20 99.96 99.83 99.39 98.1 
40 99.97 99.87 100 97.09 
60 99.93 99.52 99.72 96.41 
80 99.91 99.71 99.68 94.98 
100 99.86 99.67 99.63 94.42 
120 99.89 99.61 99.56 93.07 
140 99.87 99.53 99.52 93.07 
Ralstonia solanacearum  
20 100 98.89 99.52 97.94 
40 99.91 99.83 99.42 95.38 
60 99.9 99.87 98.78 93.1 
80 100 100 99.42 92.86 
100 100 100 99.02 90.91 
120 100 100 98.57 75 
140 100 100 98 75 
Phytophthora ramorum 
  
20 99.45 98.95 96.41 24.78 
40 99.75 99.57 97.66 30.58 
60 99.66 99.37 95.68 14.14 
80 99.76 99.68 98.52 48.94 
100 98.04 100 100 100 
120 99.75 99.26 98.11 45.45 
140 99.43 99.22 95.77 28.57 
Puccinia graminis 
  
20 98.28 96.52 87.8 30.54 
40 99.36 98.65 94.12 44.22 
60 99.17 97.87 92.69 35.86 
80 99.69 99.35 97.77 56.9 
100 99.71 99.2 98.5 60.78 
120 99.75 99.28 98.07 66.67 
140 99.91 99.45 98.21 57.14 
 
Continuation of Table 2 from page 58. 
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Table3. P-values of EDNA diagnostic call. 
 
  
15-25% 
 
5-15% 
 
0.5-5% 
 
<0.5% 
 
0% 
B
G
M
V
 
Top 50 0.031 0.031 0.000   0.026 0.022 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.001   0.007 0.004 0.384   0.077 0.765 0.243 
Top 10 0.000 0.034 0.000 
 
0.000 0.042 0.003 
 
0.001 0.006 0.001 
 
0.008 0.005 0.582 
 
0.151 0.327 0.611 
Top 5 0.012 0.012 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.007 0.005 0.018 
 
0.008 0.045 0.654 
 
0.432 0.396 0.590 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.005 0.000 
 
0.006 0.004 0.788 
 
0.769 0.978 0.936 
P
P
V
 
Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.001 0.001 0.001   0.000 0.009 0.035   0.374 0.018 0.052   0.334 0.310 0.096 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.002 0.026 
 
0.397 0.019 0.057 
 
0.562 0.629 0.153 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.007 
 
0.390 0.020 0.057 
 
0.681 0.953 0.489 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.376 0.020 0.007 
 
0.904 0.384 0.947 
S
. 
ci
tr
i 
Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.164 0.202 0.001   0.970 0.431 0.277 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.040 0.102 0.001 
 
0.673 0.786 0.170 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.052 0.109 0.001 
 
0.910 0.277 0.383 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.083 0.098 0.001 
 
0.904 0.384 0.947 
C
a
. 
L
. 
as
ia
ti
cu
s 
Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.003 0.007 0.001   0.027 0.009 0.027 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.010 0.017 0.006 
 
0.198 0.003 0.009 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.017 0.023 0.021 
 
0.308 0.003 0.039 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.035 0.030 0.042 
 
0.631 0.005 0.029 
R
. 
so
la
n
a
ce
a
ru
m
  
Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.002 0.000   0.605 0.648 0.011   0.061 0.174 0.056 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.586 0.057 0.025 
 
0.256 0.656 0.208 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.081 0.012 0.223 
 
0.105 0.448 0.231 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.073 0.008 0.067 
 
0.218 0.953 0.392 
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15-25% 
 
5-15% 
 
0.5-5% 
 
<0.5% 
 
0% 
X
. 
o
ry
ze
a
 Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.060 0.811 0.002   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.824 0.173 0.650 
 
0.000 0.001 0.002 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.010 0.004 0.074 
 
0.521 0.157 0.398 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.003 0.001 0.033 
 
0.016 0.016 0.089 
X
. 
fa
st
id
io
sa
  Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.745 0.306 0.025   0.316 0.222 0.271 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.002 0.000 0.018 
 
0.003 0.000 0.006 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.001 0.000 0.007 
 
0.004 0.000 0.027 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.003 0.000 0.026 
 
0.031 0.001 0.514 
P
. 
g
ra
m
in
is
  Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.006 0.000 0.001   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.333 0.428 0.894 
 
0.413 0.009 0.020 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
P
. 
ra
m
o
ru
m
 Top 50 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.083 0.508   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Top 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.479 0.049 
 
0.000 0.014 0.000 
Top 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.350 0.004 0.000 
 
0.338 0.007 0.019 
Top 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.257 
 
Continuation of Table 3 from page 60. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental flow of E-probe Diagnostic Nucleic acid Assay pipeline (EDNA). 
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Figure 2. The total number of hits from a BLAST search of 80 base target virus e-probe sets 
against MSDs containing grapevine and target pathogen sequences at (A) 15–25%, (B) 5–15%, 
(C) 0.5–5% and (D) < 0.5% pathogen read abundances. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The total number of hits from a BLAST search of 80 base target prokaryotic pathogen 
e-probe sets against MSDs containing grapevine and target pathogen sequences at (A) 15–25%, 
(B) 5–15%, (C) 0.5–5% and (D) < 0.5% pathogen read abundances. 
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Figure 4. The total number of hits from a BLAST search of 80 base eukaryotic pathogens e-
probe sets against MSDs containing grapevine and target pathogen sequences at (A) 15–25%, (B) 
5–15%, (C) 0.5–5% and (D) < 0.5% pathogen read abundances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of matches (positive e-probes) for each given length of e-probes, for target 
viruses at (A) 15–25%, (B) 5–15%, (C) 0.5–5% and (D) < 0.5% pathogen read abundances. 
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Figure 6. Number of matches (positive e-probes) for each given length of e-probes, for target 
prokaryotic pathogens at (A) 15–25%, (B) 5–15%, (C) 0.5–5% and (D) < 0.5% pathogen read 
abundances. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Number of matches (positive e-probes) for each given length of e-probes, for target 
eukaryotic pathogens at (A) 15–25%, (B) 5–15%, (C) 0.5–5% and (D) < 0.5% pathogen read 
abundances. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
A NOVEL TOOL FOR DETECTION OF PROKAYOTIC PLANT PATHOGENS USING 
NEXT GENERATION SEQUENCING AND EDNA 
 
ABSTRACT 
Biosecurity agencies around the globe require plant pathogen detection to prevent or lessen the 
risk of pathogen introductions. The detection and identification systems need to be readily 
adjusted as to meet current and future biological threats. Although individual pathogen assays 
abound, and some multiplex assays have been developed, current screening methods are limited 
in the total number of pathogens they detect concurrently. Combining bioinformatics with next 
generation sequencing (NGS) allows for the creation of a single assay to detect, simultaneously, 
any and all microbes in a sample, including pathogens that have been genetically modified. The 
adaptation of bioinformatic pipelines for query “electronic probe” generation and screening using 
BLASTn for plant tissues infected with Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 biovar 2 (Rs r3b2) and 
Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato DC3000 (DC3000), this research facilitates the detection of 
these two bacteria in a complex host sample. Pathogen specific queries, ranging in lengths from 
15 nt to 80 nt, were created for detection of Rs r3b2 and DC3000. The e-probe sets were used to 
query NGS data of diseased hosts, potato inoculated with Rs r3b2, and tomato inoculated with 
DC3000. The NGS data against which the e-probes were tested contained sequences from 
multiple bacteria, fungi, plant genomes, mitochondrial genomes, and a chloroplast genome,
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 typical of a metagenomic sample from an infected plant.  Both bacterial pathogens were readily 
detectable; suggesting NGS data can be used for the screening of targeted prokaryotes by using e-
probes. This research merges bioinformatics and plant pathology for addressing both agricultural 
and national security detection and diagnostic needs.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Today’s intensive movement of agricultural commodities from state to state or from one 
country to another increases the risk of exotic plant pathogen introductions. Biosecurity agencies 
need tools to screen all high-threat plant pathogens in a single assay. Current plant pathogen 
screening tools include immunoassays, which are rapid and allow for high volumes of processing, 
but may lack the sensitivity standards required in cases where high consequence pathogens are 
being screened for presence or absence. Nucleic acid based tests, such as quantitative polymerase 
chain reaction (qPCR), are highly sensitive and selective when compared to immunoassays, but 
are limited in the total number of pathogens screened per reaction (Kim et al. 2008; Zhang et al. 
2007). Additionally, if there is very little diseased plant material available, the diagnostics could 
be limited in the number of test that can be performed due to degradation of the original sample 
that occurs when processing it for immuno- or nucleic acid assays, which could result in non-
diagnosis or false negatives. An alternative would be using a single protocol for both processing 
of plant material for next generation sequencing (NGS) and screening the resulting data with a 
bioinformatics tool as discussed in Stobbe et al. (2013).  To test this approach two prokaryotic 
plant pathogens were used: Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 biovar 2 (Rs r3b2), which has been 
designated by the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) as a select 
agent, and Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato str. DC3000 (DC3000), a model organism to study 
virulence mechanisms in both Arabidopsis thaliana and tomato (Xin and He 2013). Rs r3b2 strain 
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is the causal pathogen of bacterial wilt or brown rot of potato and tomato, and DC3000 is the 
causal pathogen of bacterial speck of tomato (Champoiseau and Momol 2008; Zhao et al. 2003). 
In this research, Solanum tuberosum (potato) inoculated with Rs r3b2 and Solanum lycopersicum 
(tomato) inoculated with DC3000 will be used as host and target pathogen, respectively.   
To detect a variety of plant pathogens of various taxa, including prokaryotes, eukaryotes 
and viruses in a single assay next generation sequencing (NGS) data obtained from metagenomic 
sampling of diseased plant tissues was used. The enormous amount of sequence data generated 
during an NGS run is a limiting factor in current research using NGS because of the high 
computational demand required for assembly and annotation. High computational demands 
overwhelm most computers not set up on cluster systems, in which algorithms divide the 
workload among numerous processors, thereby reducing the total time and computational load 
required to assemble the NGS data (Karypis et al. 1999). While working in the cluster 
environment reduces processing time and computational load, there are costs of setting up and 
maintaining the cluster. Also, with most academic based cluster systems there are wait times to 
submit jobs for processing as well as a risk of error due to script coding mistakes, both of which 
can hamper data processing and result in flawed output files. A plausible alternative to 
circumvent such problems is to remove the assembly and annotation steps, which require high 
performance computing. Ideally, research scientists or diagnostic labs would use their own 
dedicated computer, far less costly than a cluster system, to screen an NGS run of suspect plant 
tissue. A recent report by Stobbe et al. (2013) described such approach for detection of numerous 
classes of plant pathogens. 
Rather than time-consuming assembly and annotation, an unassembled raw NGS data file 
can be queried electronically with generated e-probes for particular pathogens of interest (Stobbe 
et al. 2013). This approach requires far less computational processing used in assembling and 
annotating of NGS data, and can be performed on a personal computer. E-probe Diagnostic 
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Nucleic acid Analysis (EDNA) methodology works by first generating electronic probes (e-
probes) for a particular prokaryotic, eukaryotic and/or viral pathogen. To generate e-probes the 
entire genome of a target pathogen, and that of a near neighbor genome, are downloaded and 
processed through bioinformatic pipelines, in which the user sets e-probe length. The resulting 
output file, containing e-probes, contains several hundred to thousands unique target pathogen 
digital sequences depending on the genome size and similarity of the target pathogen and near 
neighbor (Stobbe et al. 2013). The file containing e-probes is used to query a raw NGS data file 
by BLASTn. The resulting BLASTn file is parsed at e-values of 1e-3, 1e-6, or 1e-9, and the 
resulting data file is analyzed for total matches, hits, and number of e-probes used in the query. 
Depending on the presence or absence of matches, a diagnostics of positive (pathogen present) or 
negative (pathogen absent) is made. Additionally, EDNA can run on a laptop computer, providing 
greater mobility than a desktop or cluster computer for data analysis.  
This research describes the adaptation and biological validation of EDNA-NGS assay for the 
detection of the prokaryotic plant pathogens Rs r3b2 and DC3000 in a plant metagenomic 
sample.  
 
Materials and Methods 
General procedures. In an effort to optimize extraction of total nucleic acids from 
purified bacterial cultures and symptomatic plants, multiple extractions were used including a 
phenol-chloroform procedure and multiple commercial kits obtained from Qiagen. Total nucleic 
acids from Rs r3b2 infected potato tubers and pure bacterial cultures extracted by phenol-
chloroform separation (Wallis et al. 2007) were provided by William Schneider, Foreign Disease 
and Weeds Science, United States Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service 
(USDA-ARS), Ft. Detrick, MD. Total nucleic acids from DC3000 infected tomato plant leaves 
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and pure bacterial cultures were extracted by commercial kits including; DNeasy and RNeasy 
Mini Plant Kits, Blood and Tissue Kit, and RNeasy Mini Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) (Table 1). 
All nucleic acid samples were processed using whole genome amplification (WGA) and whole 
transcriptome amplification (WTA) (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO) or a combined WGA/WTA 
protocol provided by Diana Sherman, Foreign Disease-Weeds Science, United States Department 
of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS), Fort Detrick, MD and then sent to 
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology Recombinant DNA and Protein Core Facility (Oklahoma 
State University, Stillwater, OK) or Foreign Disease and Weeds Laboratory United States 
Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS) (Fort Detrick, MD) for 
sequencing on a 454 pyrosequencer (Roche GS Junior, 454 Life Sciences, Branford, CT). For an 
overview of procedures used in processing pure bacterial cultures and plant samples, refer to 
Figure1. All post sequencing data were processed according to Stobbe et al. (2013). 
Generation of e-probes. E-probes were generated for detection of the plant pathogens 
Rs r3b2 and DC3000 using a laptop computer with an Intel Core i5 processor and 8 GB RAM. 
Because genome sequence of Rs r3b2 was not available at the time of this research, the related 
strain Rs GMI1000 race 1 (Salanoubat et al. 2002), was used in its place. The DC3000’s (Buell et 
al. 2003) genome was available. For both pathogens the entire genomes consisted of 
chromosomes and plasmids. Near neighbor selection was based on phylogenetic relationships and 
the availability of complete genome data. R. pickettii 12D and P. aeruginosa PAO1were chosen 
as near neighbors for comparison with Rs GMI1000 and DC3000, respectively (Table 2). The 
first bioinformatic script used to generate e-probes aligns the target and near neighbor, then 
identifies unique sequences to the target pathogen at a predetermined length. The resulting file 
goes through an additional filtering step to increase specificity. The filtering script works by 
querying all e-probes, generated in the first step, against the entire NCBI nucleotide database, 
using BLAST. The resulting file contains each e-probe with an attached label of the particular 
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organism(s) it matched. A third script searchers the labels to identify the e-probes the user wants 
to keep; all non-target labeled e-probes are removed, leaving the user with e-probes only 
matching the target pathogen.    
Tomato plant growth 
 Glamour tomato seeds (Victory Seeds, Molalla, OR) were potted using Miracle-Gro 
Potting Mix (Scotts, Marysville, OH) and placed in a Conviron E8 growth chamber (Conviron, 
Manitoba, Canada). Plants were grown at 23°C with humidity set at 80% and light intensity set to 
40µMOL. Plants were allowed to grow three to four weeks post emergence to obtain mature 
leaves which were inoculated with DC3000 using sterile swabs.  
Bacterial cultures  
DC3000 growth and inoculation. A single DC3000 colony was transferred from a 
King’s B agar streak plate (Schaad 1980) to 10 ml King’s B broth and incubated at 28°C with 
constant shaking at 120 rpm using an orbital shaker (Thermo Scientific, Forma 420, Houston, 
TX) for 48 hr. Subcultures were made by transferring 1ml broth culture to 10ml King’s B broth 
after 48 hours as needed for experimentation. Subcultures had a 4.6 x 10
8
 CFU/ml average 
(Schaad 1980). For swab inoculations, broth cultures were centrifuged at 5000 x g for 5 minutes 
using a Fisher Scientific, Marathon 6K. Supernatant was removed leaving a bacterial pellet. 
Sterile cotton swabs were used to gather the pellet and inoculate seven to eight week old tomato 
plants by rubbing and wounding the underside of tomato leaves. Inoculated tomato plants were 
covered using 1 gal clear plastic storage bags for 72 hrs. Symptomatic tomato leaves were 
gathered two to three weeks post inoculation. Tissues of infected leaves were harvested by using 
razor blades soaked in 70% EtOH, flamed briefly and allowed to cool. Leaves were placed on 
weighing paper, cut into smaller pieces, and weighed to obtain ≤ 100mg to be used in extraction 
procedures. 
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Total nucleic acid extraction  
 Rs r3b2 nucleic acid extraction. Total nucleic acids were extracted from Rs r3b2-
inoculated potato tubers and from pure cultures of Rs r3b2 using phenol-chloroform as described 
by Wallis et al. (2007) and were provided by William Schneider, Foreign Disease and Weeds 
Science, United States Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS), 
Ft. Detrick, MD. 
DC3000 DNA extraction. Extraction of DC3000 DNA was done using a Qiagen Blood 
and Tissue Kit following the manufacture’s Gram-negative bacteria protocol, from fresh (48hr at 
28°C) King’s B broth cultures except that 50µl of buffer AE was used instead of the 
recommended 200µl during the final elution step to increase final concentration.  
DC3000 RNA extraction. Extraction of DC3000 RNA was done using a Qiagen RNeasy 
Mini Kit following the manufacture’s protocol, from fresh King’s B broth DC3000 cultures (48hr 
at 28°C). To increase final concentration, the first 30µl eluate from the initial elution was 
reapplied to the filter to elute a second time per Qiagen RNeasy Mini Kit protocol. 
DNA extraction from DC3000 infected tomato plant tissues. To extract DNA from 
symptomatic tomato plants, the Qiagen Blood and Tissue Kit was used as described above 
(DC3000 DNA extraction) because of availability and successful extraction from DC3000 
cultures.  
RNA extraction from DC3000 infected tomato plant tissues. To obtain RNA from 
infected tomato leaf tissues, the Qiagen RNeasy Plant Mini Kit was used according to the 
manufacture’s protocol including taking the eluate from the initial elution and reapplying it to the 
filter to elute a second time to increase final concentration. 
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Removal of plant leaf rRNA 
A Ribo-Zero Magnetic Kit (Plant Leaf) (Illumina, Epicentre, Madison, WI) was used to 
remove plant ribosomal material from extracted total nucleic acids from the tubers of 
symptomatic potato plants previously inoculated with Rs r3b2 by using plant specific primers 
according to the manufacture’s protocol (Sooknanan et al. 2011).  
Amplification of extracted total nucleic acids 
Modified whole genome amplification and whole transcriptome amplification 
(WGA/WTA). The GenomePlex Whole Genome Amplification Kit (WGA) and TransPlex 
Whole Transcriptome Amplification Kit (WTA) (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO) were performed 
on all Rs r3b2 infected potato leaf samples, following a combined protocol provided by Diana 
Sherman, Foreign Disease-Weeds Science, United States Department of Agriculture-Agricultural 
Research Service (USDA-ARS), Fort Detrick, MD. A concentration of 300ng/µl of total nucleic 
acids from Rs r3b2 infected potato tuber sample was added to 1.6µl 10x fragmentation buffer and 
enough nuclease-free water to bring the volume to 16.5µl. The mixture was incubated 4 min at 
95ºC and then placed on ice. A volume of 5µl of synthesis buffer and 2.5µl stabilization buffer 
were added and the tube was incubated at 95ºC for 2 min and then placed on ice. A volume of 1µl 
of library enzyme was added and the tube was placed in a Biometra T-Professional thermocycler 
(Goettingen, Germany) at 24ºC for 15 min, 42ºC for 2 hr and 95ºC for 5 min. A WTA master mix 
(300µl water, 37.5µl WTA amplification master mix, 7.5µl dNTP mix, 5 µl Titanium Taq) was 
added to 25µl of the 375µl extract prepared above. The sample was divided into 75µl aliquots (5 
PCR tubes) and placed in a Biometra thermocycler at 95ºC, 3 min, and then cycled 20 times at 
94ºC for 20 sec and 65ºC for 5 min.  
DNA only WGA amplification. For DNA extracted using Qiagen kits, a GenomePlex 
Whole Genome Amplification Kit (WGA) (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO) was used following 
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the manufacture’s protocol except that the DNA concentration was increased from one to 20ng/µl 
to produce greater concentrations.  
RNA only WTA amplification.  For RNA extracted using Qiagen kits, a TransPlex 
Whole Transcriptome Amplification Kit (WTA) (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO) was used 
following the manufacture’s protocol.  
Bead sizing  
 Removing small fragments of genomic material in a sample to be sequenced by the 454 
Junior pyrosequencer reduces the instrument’s bias towards tiny fragments and increases the 
proportion of usable reads. In place of the nebulization step used in the Roche 454 Junior 
pyrosequencer  protocol a bead sizing protocol provided by Diana Sherman, Foreign Disease-
Weeds Science, United States Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-
ARS), Fort Detrick, MD, was used. Rs r3b2 samples, including both the Ribo-Zero treated and 
non-treated samples were subjected to bead sizing following WGA/WTA. A volume of 140µl 
Agencourt AMPure XP (Beckman Coulter, Brea, CA) magnetic beads were combined with 3µg 
amplified nucleic acid and water to bring the volume of the reaction to 240µl. The samples were 
mixed by vortexing for 5 min, spun briefly (1-2 sec) on a Fisher Scientific mini centrifuge at 2000 
x g, and placed in a magnetic rack for approximately 5 min to allow binding of nucleic acid 
fragments of 200bp to 10kb to attach to the beads. The supernatant was removed, 100µl 70% 
EtOH was added and mixed by vortexing, and, after a brief spin (1-2 sec) at 2000 x g the tube 
was placed into a magnetic rack (DynaMag-2, Invitrogen, Oslo, Norway) (this step starting with 
removing the supernatant and adding EtOH was repeated one time).With the tube still in the 
magnetic rack, the supernatant was removed and the beads allowed to dry for 5-10 min to allow 
the EtOH to evaporate. The adhering nucleic acid fragments were eluted from the beads by 
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adding 20µl of TE buffer, vortexing, and brief spin (1-2 sec) at 2000 x g, and replaced onto the 
magnetic rack. Supernatant, containing the nucleic acids, was collected in a sterile 1.5ml tube. 
Sequencing  
 Five separate NGS runs were performed on a Roche 454 Junior pyrosequencer. Three 
separate sequencing runs with Rs r3b2 as the target pathogen, and two separate sequencing runs 
with DC3000 as the target pathogen were completed.  Material for sequencing was processed 
according to the manufacturer’s protocol (454 Life Sciences, Roche, Bradford, CT) except for the 
omission of the nebulizer step, which removes significant amounts of DNA and could therefore 
remove critical target pathogen sequences present in comparatively low titers compared to host 
DNA, personal communications with Diana Sherman, USDA-ARS. A bead sizing step was 
performed on Rs r3b2 nucleic acid containing material as a substitute to nebulizing prior to 
sequencing.  DC3000 containing samples were neither nebulized nor the bead sized.  
Roche barcoding 
 Two distinct barcodes were added to one 454 Junior pyrosequencing run containing one 
tube of DC3000 culture total nucleic acids and one tube of healthy tomato plant total nucleic 
acids. Barcodes RL11 (ACTATACGAGT) and RL12 (ACTCGCGTCGT) were attached to the 
total nucleic acid samples from DC3000 and healthy tomato, respectively.  
 
RESULTS 
Generation of e-probes 
The DC3000 genome size was 6.54Mb with a GC% of 58.3 and that of Rs GMI1000 was 
5.81Mb with a GC% of 67. Genome sizes of the near neighbor bacteria were similar in size, with 
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P. aeruginosa PAO1 at 6.26Mb and a GC% of 66.6 and R. pickettii 12D at 5.69Mb and a GC% of 
63.3. E-probes with lengths of 15, 20, 25, 40, and 60 nt were generated for DC3000 by comparing 
the target pathogen to the neighbor using only the initial script discussed in Stobbe et al. (2013). 
Similarly, e-probes of 20, 25, 40, and 60nt were generated for Rs GMI1000. The first 20 e-probes 
(15, 20, 25, 40, and 60 nt) generated for DC3000 were queried against NCBI’s nucleotide 
database using BLASTn. Querying the first 20 15 nt e-probes generated for DC3000 produced no 
matches to the target pathogen. The 15 nt e-probes matched a variety of organisms including the 
Gram positive bacterium Bifidobacterium spp. and Capra hircus (goat) and the Gram negative 
bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Macaca fascicularis (crab-eating monkey). Of the 20-nt 
e-probes, only 5 of the first 20 yielded matches to the target pathogen. The remaining DC3000 e-
probes matched multiple non-target organisms as diverse as Pseudomonas, Azotobacter 
vinelandii (a soil borne N2 fixer) and Chrysemys picta (painted turtle).  E-probes of 25 nt yielded 
more matches with the target pathogen; in fact, only one non-target match (Chondrus crispus, 
Irish moss) was observed.  One 25-nt e-probe (ACCTAGATGTCTCTTAGTCGCGTCT) yielded 
a score, e-value and coverage with matches to two non-targets.  For all remaining 18 25-nt 
DC3000 e-probes the top match was with the target pathogen. For the 40-nt DC3000 e-probes, 
only two of the first twenty matched the non-target species Pseudomonas syringae pv. 
maculicola, while the remaining 40 nt e-probes matched the target pathogen. Of the 80-nt 
DC3000 e-probes, only one matched a non-target organism, Pseudomonas syringae PT14; the 
remaining 80-nt e-probes matched the target pathogen. Comparing DC3000 e-probes of all 
lengths, the percentage of probes matching the target pathogen increased as probe length 
increased above 20 nt. With the lack in specificity of the e-probes obtained by only using the 
initial script, additional filters to remove non-target e-probes were used. The final e-probes, after 
the additional filtering, only contained target specific e-probes for DC3000 and Rs GMI1000.   
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Extractions 
R. solanacearum r3b2. All Rs r3b2 total nucleic acid material was provided by Aaron 
Sechler, Foreign Disease-Weeds Science, United States Department of Agriculture-Agricultural 
Research Service (USDA-ARS), Fort Detrick, MD.  Concentrations of two nucleic acid 
extractions from Rs r3b2 inoculated potato tubers were 169.6ng/µl and 260.3ng/µl (Table 1). The 
260.3ng/µl sample was processed with the RiboZero kit to remove plant ribosomal nucleic acid, 
yielding a nucleic acid concentration of 17.2ng/µl. The sample with a nucleic acid concentration 
of 169.6ng/µl was not processed with the Ribo-Zero kit.  
Pseudomonas syringae DC3000. DNA extracted and purified from DC3000 cultures at 
4.6 x 10
8
 CFU/ml was present at 688.4ng/µl, while RNA concentration was 155.1ng/µl. Nucleic 
acid extracted from symptomatic tomato leaves using the Qiagen Blood and Tissue Kit was 
784.1ng/µl; and RNA obtained using the RNeasy Mini Plant Kit was 719.4ng/µl (Table 1). 
Non-inoculated tomato plants. Nucleic acids obtained using the DNeasy Plant Mini Kit 
from healthy tomato leaves, were 294.3ng/µl and 219.7ng/µl, while that obtained using the 
Qiagen RNeasy Mini Plant Kit was 819ng/µl and 1365 ng/µl (Table 1). 
Amplification of total nucleic acid 
 WGA/WTA combined protocol. Post extraction, a sample of Rs r3b2 inoculated potato 
tubers had a nucleic acid concentration of 169.6ng/µl; after WGA/WTA amplification the 
concentration was 365.4ng/µl. A similar sample from which cytoplasmic rRNA was removed 
using the Ribo-Zero kit had an initial concentration of 17.2ng/µl; after WGA/WTA amplification 
the concentration was 154ng/µl .  
 DNA only WGA amplification. All DNAs subjected to the WGA protocol after 
extraction were adjusted to 20ng/µl. DNA from DC3000 cultures, or from symptomatic or non-
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symptomatic tomato leaves, and extracted using the Blood and Tissue Kit, had post-WGA 
concentrations of 134.4ng/µl, 133.4 ng/µl, and 138.2ng/µl, respectively.  
 RNA only WTA amplification. All RNAs amplified using the WTA protocol were 
adjusted to 300ng/µl. RNA from DC3000 cultures, extracted using the RNeasy Mini Kit had a 
final concentration of 551ng/µl post WTA. RNA from symptomatic and non-symptomatic tomato 
plants, obtained using the RNeasy Mini Plant Kit, had final concentrations of 575.5 ng/µl and 
547.2ng/µl, respectively.  
Bead sizing 
 For the Rs r3b2 sample not processed with the Ribo-Zero kit, the initial concentration 
was 365.4ng/µl post WGA/WTA with a final concentration of 28.8ng/µl post bead sizing. For the 
sample processed with the Ribo-Zero kit, the initial concentration was 154ng/µl post WGA/WTA 
and a final concentration of 19.1ng/µl post bead sizing.  
454 pyrosequencing 
 Five NGS runs were performed on a 454 Junior pyrosequencer on samples including; 
potato tuber nucleic acids mixed with Rs r3b3 nucleic acids at a 4 to 1 ratio, treated and non-
treated Rs r3b2 infected potato samples with Ribo-Zero, barcoded DC3000 culture and tomato 
plant total nucleic acids, and DC3000 infected tomato plant.  With most of the data close to or 
exceeding Roche’s recommended values, all five NGS runs were considered successful (Table 3). 
For total raw wells, Roche recommends ≤300,000 and all five sequencing runs met this criteria. 
The recommended read length is >300 bp and all five NGS runs exceeded this value with the 
potato tuber and Rs r3b3 4 to 1 mix having the shortest average read length of 322.1 bp and the 
DC3000 infected tomato plant sample having the longest average read length of 433.9 bp. The 
number of passed filter reads and passed filtered bases for potato tuber and Rs r3b3 nucleic acids 
mixed, Rs r4b3 infected potato samples treated with Ribo-Zero, and barcoded DC3000 and 
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tomato plant all were below recommended values; however, all produced a significant amount of 
data (Table 3). 
E-probe queries of 454 pyrosequencing 
 All of the 454 pyrosequencing data output files, termed sample sequence databases 
(SSDs), were formatted then queried using e-probes and BLASTn. The total numbers of matches 
are shown in Figures 3 - 7. A match was defined as an instance in which an individual e-probe 
aligned with a sequence in a SSD, such that the total number of matches was equal to or less than 
the total number of e-probes. After the query search was conducted the data was parsed according 
to four different e-value thresholds at 1e-1,
 
1e-3, 1e-6, and 1e-9. 
 
DISCUSSION 
When using current molecular approaches for pathogen detection a diagnostician’s 
decision about whether a sample is positive or negative for a particular pathogen is dependent on 
a reporter label, in the case of immunoassays, or a fluorescent probe (rtPCR) or small DNA 
agarose band fragment, in the case of a nucleic acid based approach. In both of these cases, pre-
characterization of pathogen protein or nucleic acid sequences is required, and a limited number 
of different pathogens can be detected in a single assay (Postnikova 2008). Other considerations, 
such as primer thermodynamics, buffer and MgCl2 concentrations, melting temperatures, non-
specific binding, and non-antigen binding should be optimized to avoid possible false positives 
and false negatives, which could cause costly delays and even erroneous conclusions.  The use of 
454 pyrosequencing merged with bioinformatics avoids some of the concerns associated with 
traditional diagnostic approaches. However, NGS, combined with a bioinformatics approach, 
cannot completely replace other techniques used in diagnostic labs; rather, it is a new tool with 
the capability of screening a sample for all classes of pathogens in a single assay. 
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Advantages to using  NGS and bioinformatics for pathogen detection include the 
generation of a complete metagenomic profile of the sample, which includes genetic information 
on all organisms (pathogens, endophytes, and organelles, both known and unknown) in the 
infected plants as well as the host itself (Jones 2010; Tyson et al. 2004).  
In this study, the 454 Junior pyrosequencer sequencing runs produced millions of 
sequence bases for each sample, creating a snapshot of all biological material present in the 
sample at that given moment. The output file from each NGS run was saved as a digital file, 
accessible indefinitely.  Data stored in this way can be manipulated for microbial detection and 
identification in the future.  As we discover new pathogens, or re-discover existing ones, we can 
explore previous NGS sequences to re-assess possible roles of pathogens in disease outbreaks of 
the past.  Other novel applications are sure to emerge as the costs of NGS technology continue to 
decline and potential uses continue to arise.   
Because EDNA analyses all nucleic acid sequences in a sample it avoids some of the 
common pitfalls of traditional immunological and molecular diagnostic technologies. Features 
such as tertiary folding, nucleotide bond strength, percent GC, and polymerase activity are 
irrelevant.  
The objective of this work was to test a simplified bioinformatics approach for dealing 
with the complexity of NGS metagenomic data as described in EDNA by querying raw NGS data 
with e-probes, for the purpose of detecting and identifying prokaryotic plant pathogens. To 
achieve this goal, a SSD was formatted to be searchable, much like using NCBI.  The formatted 
SSD was queried by diagnostic signature sequences (e-probes) without the need for assembly or 
quality checks. All bioinformatic steps can be performed on a personal laptop computer. 
The selection of e-probes appropriate for a given target pathogen is critical for querying 
the NGS run. E-probes of 15, 20, 25, 40 and 60 nt were generated for DC3000. As a quality check 
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a few e-probes of each size were used in BLASTn searches on NCBI. During e-probe generation 
the entire genome, including the chromosome(s) and all plasmids, are used for both the target 
pathogen and near neighbor. In contrast, traditional molecular primer/probe design considers only 
a small section of the genome, such as 16S rRNA, 18S rRNA or the ITS regions. Because entire 
genomes are used to design e-probes, it is expected that a few sequences could generate matches 
with universal or common genes in non-target organisms. However, we anticipate that a majority 
will match only our targeted pathogen and with the use of additional filters in the e-probe design 
suboptimal e-probes are removed.  
When considering DC3000 e-probes of lengths between 15 to 60 nt we expected and 
observed, among the first 20 e-probes at each length, that as probe length increases the likelihood 
of matching with a non-target decreases. The first 20 DC3000 e-probes of 15 nt failed to match 
with the target, which is not surprising considering that the probability of 15 nt matching a 
random sequence in the NCBI database is greater than 60 nt sequences matching randomly to 
sequence in the NCBI database. Even in molecular nucleic acid based approaches, primers of 15 
nt or less are undesirable due to the likelihood that they will bind to non-target sequences. In this 
study the 20 nt DC3000 e-probes were no more suitable than the 15 nt e-probes. Not until the 
length was increased to 25 nt and longer did we observe consistent matches to the target 
pathogen. Since lengths equal to or greater than 25 nt are suitable for molecular routine detection,  
since the first twenty15 nt e-probes for DC3000 yielded poor results, Rs r3b2 were designed at 
lengths of only 20, 25, 40, and 60 nt.   
 Several total nucleic acid extraction were compared. The basic phenol-chloroform 
procedure (Wallis et al. 2007) used on samples containing Rs r3b2 is relatively inexpensive 
compared to kit extractions. The kits used for samples containing DC3000 cost $155 to $333, and  
since every sample required two kits, one each for DNA and RNA, the total cost reaches $500 to 
$600.  Extraction kits generally yield greater nucleic acid yields than phenol-chloroform 
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separations, but higher nucleic acid concentrations may not result in a better sequencing read. 
Considering all of the factors, the use of commercial extraction kits did not significantly improve 
the performance of EDNA for detecting prokaryotes in our experiments.   
When plants are imported, arrive at a diagnostic laboratory or are purchased for home use 
they may be carrying pathogens even if no disease symptoms are visible (Lemay 2003). Pathogen 
titers vary from plant to plant and even within different tissues of a single plant. Because the plant 
host genome will make up a majority of the nucleic acid obtained from the initial extractions it is 
important to limit the downstream bias as the sample is prepared for 454 sequencing. To address 
this issue, the WGA kit, which chemically fragments all nucleic acids to smaller fragments, 
reduces large host DNA fragments to be closer in size to the bacterial and viral genomes. If a 
pathogen is present in low titer it may be possible to take advantage of cellular communication 
among the pathogens for amplification. WTA was used to enhance this ‘transcriptome noise.’ 
Together, the WGA/WTA treatments reduce host bias and increase pathogen transcriptome 
activity on the molecular level.  
Before sequencing, post WGA/WTA Rs r3b2 samples were subjected to bead sizing, in 
which smaller fragments (≥ 200 bp, smaller than the 300-500 bp size considered optimal for 
Roche 454 sequencing (Margulies et al. 2005)) observed in gel smears of the WTA/WGA 
samples were removed. Sequencing of these modified Rs r3b2 samples was done without a 
nebulizing step since fragment size reduction was done by bead sizing. DC3000 samples were 
processed without bead sizing. The 454 protocol, without the nebulizing step, was exactly the 
same for samples of both Rs and DC3000. There was not enough difference between the two to 
warrant the additional cost and procedure of performing bead sizing (Table 3).  The addition of 
processing steps, such as removal of host RNA by Ribo-Zero and removal of sub-optimal DNA 
fragments by bead sizing, do not improve sequencing results and may even reduce sequencing 
efficiency.  
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Bioinformatic analysis of the sequencing data began with formatting the raw 454 output 
(sample sequence databases or SSD) using a formatting script that allows the file to be queried by 
BLAST. Next, a BLASTn query using target e-probes generated a file that was parsed at various 
e-values by searching the BLASTn output file for every match. Every match was assigned an e-
value. The parser script was programmed so that when a match was detected at or below the set e-
value threshold of 1e-1, 1e-3, 1e-6, or 1e-9 it accepted the matching e-probe, identifying a portion 
of the target pathogen’s genome.  
The 454 pyrosequencing SSD of barcoded samples of pure DC3000 and healthy tomato 
tissues generated 15,582 DC3000 reads and 47,057 reads for the healthy tomato. Out of the 
18,788 20 nt e-probes, only 1 match was obtained after parsing at an e-value of 1e-1. No matches 
were observed when the parsing criterion was set to a more stringent e-value of 1e-3.  This result 
is not surprising considering that BLAST searches with the 20 nt e-probes identified only a few 
matches to the target. The larger e-probes of 25, 40, and 60 nt were more effective, with 59, 232, 
and176 matches, respectively, when parsed at 1e-1.
 
In order to assess the e-probes that matched 
the barcoded SSD, all 25 nt e-probes that matched the target and parsed at 1e-1 were checked by 
BLASTn on the NCBI database. Only one e-probe (AAAGTCAAAGTCAAAGTCAAAGTCA) 
out of the 59 e-probes matched a non-target sequence. The remaining 58 e-probes all matched the 
target DC3000 when queried on the NCBI webpage. However, this e-value provides little 
stringency and would potentially accept non-specific matches. Decreasing the e-value to a more 
stringent 1e-3 also decreased the total number of matches to 2, 3, 2, and 0 for e-probes at lengths 
of 25, 40, 60 and 80, respectively (Figure 3). Because the total number of matches decreased with 
increasing stringency, there is more confidence in calling this sample positive for DC3000. 
Similarly, Stobbe et al (2013) reported that optimal parsing occurred at 1e-6 or even 1e-9 due to 
false positives found at higher e-values.  
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Developing diagnostics in silico, as described in Stobe et al. 2013, is quick and relatively 
inexpensive; however, assays developed in this manner must always be validated experimentally. 
As discussed above, the barcoded SSD revealed that pathogen sequences were present in the 
sequenced sample. In a real application a diagnostician might not know what pathogens, if any, 
are present. Experiments done where DC3000 was used to inoculate a tomato plant allowed 
assessment of the potential to detect prokaryotic pathogens in a complex metagenomic sample. 
For example, when the same e-probes queried in the barcoded SSD run were used the 
symptomatic tomato leaf tissue was found positive for DC3000. When the 20 nt e-probes were 
tested they did not generated matches, but the 25, 40 and 60 nt e-probes generated high numbers 
of matches. For example, 46, 825 and 225 for 25, 40, and 60 nt e-probes, respectively when 
parsed at an e-value of 1e-1. Interestingly, the 40 and 60 nt e-probes generated a higher number 
of matches when parsed at 1e-3 and 1e-9, whereas the barcoded SSD run did not. This result 
could be due in part to the absence of barcoding. Table 3 shows that the total passed filtered bases 
or nt bases that were considered of good quality by the sequencing software for the non-barcoded 
infected tomato plant SSD were nearly three times that of the barcoded SSD run. By not 
barcoding there is greater sequencing coverage within the sample. 
Rs r3b2, a select agent, is a major concern to the potato industry in the U.S. The ability to 
detect plant pathogenic select agents is critical to the U.S. biosecurity efforts. Being able to detect 
this pathogen using e-probes of 25, 40, 60 and 80 nt with parsing at 1e-1, 1e-3, and 1e-6 was 
demonstrated (Figures 5-7). These sequencing runs include healthy potato and Rs r3b2 total 
nucleic acids mixed at a 4 to 1 ratio, and Rs r3b2 infected potato tuber that was treated with Ribo-
Zero and Rs r3b2 infected potato tuber that was untreated. GMI1000 e-probes of all sizes 
generated high numbers of matches, at all e-probe sizes when parsed at 1e-1. Using the Spiked 
SSD at a 4 to 1 ratio and the same e-probes but parsing at the more stringent e-value of 1e-3, the 
total numbers of matches were reduced and the confidence of calling a match as a true identifier 
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of the target pathogen increased.  Both the 40 and 25 nt Rs GMI1000 e-probes generated the 
greatest number of matches when parsing at more stringent e-values, suggesting the shorter 
lengths might be more appropriate than the 60 and 80 nt e-probes.  
A combined WGA/WTA protocol was performed on the two 454 sequencing runs of Rs 
r3b2 infected potato tubers including one SSD not processed through Ribo-Zero and one SSD 
processed through Ribo-Zero. AMPure bead sizing was done on both SSDs to remove small 
fragments. The Ribo-Zero kit was used on one SSD to remove host rRNA. The totals of raw 
sequencing data (Table 3) shows that the RiboZero-treated SSD generated only half the number 
of passed filter bases and passed filter reads compared to the sample without such treatment, 
suggesting that RiboZero processing reduces the chances of detecting the target pathogen 
sequences; however, when the same e-probes were used to query both SSDs there was little 
difference in detection at a parsed e-value of 1e-1 (Figures 6 and 7). Contrarily, when more 
stringent e-values of 1e-3 and 1e-6 were used there is a noticeable increase in matches with the 
sample not treated with Ribo-Zero kit. Even though the Ribo-Zero kit contains plant specific 
primers that remove most of the plant ribosomal RNA (Epicentre 2013), there is a potential of 
reducing pathogen ribosomal material, which could lessen the detection ability of the system.  
An additional assessment of both the Rs GMI1000 and DC3000 e-probes was needed to 
analyze the test specificity. The 454 pyrosecuencing SSD of DC3000 infected tomato plant was 
queried using Rs GMI1000 e-probes at lengths of 25, 40, 60, and 80 nt. All queries were parsed at 
e-values of 1e-1, 1e-3, 1e-6, and 1e-9.  The observed results indicate an elevated number of 
matches when parsing at 10
-1
; however, there were also elevated numbers of matches of 38, 31, 
and 5 for the 25, 40, and 60 nt e-probes when parsed at 1e-3, and 4 and 11 matches with 25 and 
40 nt e-probes when parsed at 1e-6. Typically, very few, if any, matches are expected. This 
suggests the possibility of a Ralstonia solanacearum species being present in the original 
extracted material. To test the specificity of the DC3000 e-probes, the 454 pyrosequencing run of 
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Rs r3b2 infected potato tuber not processed with Ribo-Zero was used. For e-probes at a length of 
25, 40, 60, and 80 nt and parsed at 1e-1, there was an observed high number of matches of 78, 
279, 225, and 50, respectively. Increasing the parser stringency to lower e-values generated only 
3 matches with the 40 nt e-probe when parsed at 1e-3.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The ability of the NGS to be used as a diagnostic tool for detection of prokaryotic plant 
pathogens was demonstrated. Extraction of sample nucleic acid by traditional and inexpensive 
phenol-chloroform separation was as effective and more cost-efficient than the use of commercial 
kits. Reduction of host background using a RiboZero kit was costly ($90/reaction, as of 
12/02/2013) and provided no observable benefit in detecting the pathogen Rs r3b2. Similarly, 
bead sizing with AMpure beads provided little to no benefit. NGS, combined with EDNA, is a 
valuable tool for rapid screening of multiple pathogens at little cost. However, the current 
bioinformatics and manipulation of computer scripts to develop e-probes and query NGS data 
requires training to operate. Further development of simple and user-friendly programs that 
automate the design of e-probes and querying of NGS data will be necessary for this technology 
to become more usable. Additional work to validate the detection threshold of the EDNA system 
and to address specificity concerns on the e-probes will be required along with adaptation of 
EDNA for strain typing and detection of genetically modified organisms.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Commercial kits and non-commercial methods used for nucleic acid extraction with nucleic acid concentrations and cost per reaction 
from samples containing bacteria, infected plant tissue and healthy plant tissue.  
Sample ID Extraction protocol 
Nucleic acid 
concentration 
260/280 260/230 DNA/RNA 
Cost per 
reaction 
Potato tuber 
a
Phenol/chloroform 30 1.79 .94 DNA/RNA n/a 
R. solanacearum r3b2  
infected potato tuber  
a
Phenol/chloroform 
169.6 
260.3 
1.62 
1.61 
1.26 
1.24 
DNA/RNA n/a 
P. syringae DC3000 
Qiagen  
Blood & Tissue Kit 
688.4 
1730.3 
2.07 
2.17 
2.3 
2.35 
DNA 
b
$3.10 
P. syringae DC3000 
Qiagen 
RNeasy Mini Kit 
155.1 
159.7 
1.92 
1.96 
1.29 
1.46 
RNA 
b
$5.52 
DC3000 infected 
 tomato plant 
Qiagen  
Blood & Tissue Kit 
498.4 
784.1 
1.31 
1.24 
0.58 
0.58 
DNA 
b
$3.10 
DC3000 infected 
 tomato plant 
Qiagen  
RNeasy Mini Plant Kit 
719.4 
792 
1.89 
1.93 
0.68 
0.74 
RNA 
b
$6.66 
Tomato plant 
Qiagen 
DNeasy Plant Mini Kit 
294.3 
237.2 
1.40 
1.42 
0.91 
0.93 
DNA 
b
$4.16 
Tomato plant 
Qiagen 
RNeasy Plant Mini Kit 
1365.0 
819.0 
1.65 
2.01 
0.95 
1.5 
RNA 
b
$6.66 
a
Wallis C, et al. 2007. J Gen Virol 88:2839-2845.  
b
Pricing as of10/14/2013 
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Table 2. Target pathogens and near neighbors, with accession number, used for 
generation of e-probes. Accession numbers are from GenBank and accessed through the 
National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI).  
Target pathogen Accession # Near neighbor Accession # 
R. solanacearum  
GMI1000 
NC_003295.1 
NC_003296.1 
Ralstonia pickettii 
12D 
NC_012856.1 
NC_012857.1  
NC_012855.1  
NC_012849.1 
NC_012851.1 
P. syringae  
pv. tomato DC3000 
NC_004578.1 
NC_004633.1 
NC_004632.1 
Pseudomonas  
aeruginosa PAO1 
NC_002516.2 
Accession numbers will link to chromosomes and plasmids when entered on NCBI 
webpage. 
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Table 3. Results of five separate 454 Junior pyrosequencing runs. One sequencing run contained a 4:1 mixture of potato tuber to Ralstonia 
solanacearum r3b2 (Rs r3b2) total nucleic acids, respectively. One sequencing run was with a potato tuber infected with Rs r3b2, while another 
run was with a potato infected with Rs r3b2 processed through a Ribo-Zero kit that removes host RNA. A barcoded sequencing run was performed 
using tomato plant and Pseudomonas syringae DC3000 total nucleic acids. The final sequencing run was of a tomato plant infected with DC3000.  
 
4:1  
Potato tuber : Rs r3b2 
Potato infected 
with Rs r3b2 
No RiboZero 
Potato infected 
with Rs r3b2 
RiboZero 
Barcoded 
Tomato plant & 
DC3000 
Tomato plant 
infected  
with DC3000 
Roche 
recommended 
values 
Total raw wells 229,810 232,938 228,689 226,692 235,492 ≤ 300,000 
Average read 
length 
322.1 353.9 324.5 391.9 433.9 > 300 bp 
Number of 
passed filter 
reads 
64,927 111,693 51,938 64,719 160,254 ≥ 88,000 
Total passed 
filter bases 
20,911,623 39,531,357 16,851,367 26,109,600 69,537,825 > 27 million 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Experimental workflow used in processing Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 
biovar 2 and Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato DC3000 cultures, healthy potato and 
tomato plants, potato plants infected with Rs r3b2 and tomato plants infected with 
DC3000. Total nucleic acids were obtained and processed through WGA/WTA 
amplification and sized with AMPure XP beads prior to sequencing.  
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Figure 2. Use of e-probe Diagnostic Nucleic acid Analysis (EDNA) to design electronic 
probes and query a next generation sequencing database. Plant sample tissue is obtained 
from symptomatic and non-symptomatic plants. 
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Figure 3. Results of an EDNA search showing total matches using Pseudomonas 
syringae pv. tomato DC3000 e-probes of a barcoded 454 pyrosequences run of healthy 
tomato and Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato DC3000 culture.  
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Figure 4. Results of an EDNA search showing total matches using Pseudomonas 
syringae pv. tomato DC3000 e-probes, of a 454 pyrosequence run of symptomatic tomato 
plant infected with Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato DC3000. 
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Figure 5. Results of an EDNA search showing total matches using Ralstonia 
solanacearum GMI1000 e-probes, of a 454 pyrosequence run of potato leaf and 
Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 biovar 2 total nucleic acids mixed at a 4 to 1 ratio, 
respectively. 
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Figure 6. Results of an EDNA search showing total matches using Ralstonia 
solanacearum GMI1000 e-probes, of a 454 pyrosequence run of a symptomatic potato 
plant infected with Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 biovar 2. 
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Figure 7. Results of an EDNA search showing total matches using R. solanacearum 
GMI1000 e-probes, of a 454 sequencing run of a symptomatic potato plant inoculated 
with R. solanacearum r3b2 and processed through a Ribo-Zero kit to remove plant 
rRNA. 
 
99 
 
 
Figure 8. Results of an EDNA search showing total matches using R. solanacearum 
GMI1000 e-probes, of a 454 pyrosequence run of a symptomatic tomato plant infected 
with Pseudomonas syringae pv. tomato DC3000. 
100 
 
 
Figure 9. Results of an EDNA search showing total matches using Pseudomonas 
syringae pv. tomato DC3000 e-probes, of a 454 pyrosequence run of a symptomatic 
potato plant infected with Ralstonia solanacearum race 3 biovar 2. 
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